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CHAPTER ONE – THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS QUO 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
The report of Justice Catherine McGuinness following the Kilkenny Incest 
Inquiry in 1993
1
 represented the first of a series of authoritative appeals for 
constitutional change to more effectively protect the rights of children. 
Subsequent examples include the report of the Constitutional Review Group
2
 and 
several ‗concluding observations‘ produced by the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child
3
. These reports have been accompanied by calls constitutional 
change from academia
4
, interest groups
5
 and members of the judicial branch
6
. 
These appeals are predicated on the idea that the constitution is failing to protect 
children and must be amended to allow it to properly do so. To assess these 
claims, it is necessary to examine the current state of constitutional law in this 
area. Chapter one will be devoted to this exercise.  
                                                 
1
 Kilkenny Incest Investigation: Report presented to Mr. Brendan Howlin TD, Minister for Health 
by South Eastern Health Board (1993) Dublin: Stationery Office. 
2
 Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996) Dublin Stationery Office 
3
 See, for example, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Ireland, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.85 (1998) 
4
 Examples include Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin (1996); 
Shannon, Child Law, Thompson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at p 45; Conor O'Mahony, Children, 
Parents and Education Rights: A Constitutional Imbalance Irish Journal of Family Law, (2004) 
7(3) IJFL 3; Fergus W. Ryan, Recognising Family Diversity: Children, One-Parent Families and 
the Law, (2006) 9(1) IJFL 3.  
5
 Examples include The Children‘s Rights Alliance, Small Voices, Vital Rights, Submission to the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (1997); Children‘s Rights Alliance, Submission to the 
Joint Committee on Child Protection, August 2006; submissions by Aim Family Services [at p 
A21], Barnardos [at p A 36] and the Church of Ireland [at p A 42] to the All Party Oireachtas 
Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006.. 
6
 See, in particular, the judgment of Mrs Justice McGuinness in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374 at 498. 
See also, DPP v JT [1988] 3 Frewen 141; Southern Health Board v CH [1996] 1 IR 231; DPP v 
Best [2000] 2 IR 17.  
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The concept of child protection has not been overly influential in constitutional 
law due, at least in part, to the lack of any special emphasis on children in the 
Constitution. Moreover, the constitutional status of the marital child has been 
further obscured by the virtually unique
7
 and wide ranging deference the 
Constitution affords to the marital family.  
 
This chapter will assess the current state of the law primarily through an 
examination, firstly, of the constitutional provisions and secondly, of 
unenumerated children‘s rights and the academic opinion thereon. The aim is to 
illustrate that, far from providing adequate protections for children, the 
Constitution is fundamentally incapable of adequately protecting children in its 
current formulation. Furthermore, it will be argued that the courts have not erred 
in their interpretation of the law and have merely presented the constitutional 
status of the child as it was meant to be interpreted. The wording of the relevant 
provisions made and makes it unlikely for any other conclusion to be occasioned.    
 
B.  The Constitutional Provisions 
 
Constitutional Provisions on the The Family 
 
                                                 
7
 As the authors of JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution comment, the articles were among the most 
innovatory in the Constitution and there were no similar provisions in the 1922 Constitution. 
They do, however note that there was a similar provision in the German Constitution of 1919. 
See JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth 
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1827-1828. They are innovatory too in the sense that such provisions 
are comparatively rare, as Beytagh comments: ―Only a limited number of modern constitutions of 
consequence contain specific provisions dealing with the protection of he family, and none 
contain language as a sweeping as that in Article 41‖ [Francis X. Beytagh, Constitutionalism in 
Contemporary Ireland: An American Perspective, RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 1997 at 
p 37.]. Therefore the protections are referred to as ―virtually unique‖.  
 6 
The Constitution of Ireland, adopted in 1937, guaranteed a novel degree of legal 
protection for the family. It was promised that the State would recognise ―the 
family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society‖8. Crucially, 
Article 41.3.1° provides that the ―…State pledges itself to guard with special care 
the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it 
against attack.‖ The rights that are afforded to the marital family are said to be 
―inalienable and imprescriptible‖9 which has been held to mean that they cannot 
be surrendered, given away, lost or forfeited over time
10
. It is now widely 
accepted that the Constitution refers to is the marital family in accordance with 
State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála
11
 and Costello J‘s decision in Murray v 
Ireland
12
, subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in TF v Ireland
13
.  
 
The aforementioned Article 41 rights accorded to the family are to be understood 
as vesting in the family unit itself rather than the individuals members of the 
family
14
. Therefore, the Constitution can be seen to afford the marital family 
such a degree of deference that Shannon felt that the Constitution establishes the 
family ―as a sort of Independent republic‖15, albeit within certain exceptional 
limits
16
. Such a formulation inevitably has the potential of limiting the protection 
of children as it restricts the State from interfering with potentially damaging acts 
done by marital parents towards their children.  
 
                                                 
8
 Article 41.1.1° 
9
 Article 41.1.1° 
10
 Per Barrington J in Fajujonu v Minister for Justice [1990] IR 151 at 157.  
11
 State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála [1966] IR 567. 
12
 Murray v Ireland [1982] IR 532. 
13
 TF v Ireland [1995] 1 IR 321. 
14
 Per Costello J in Murray v Ireland [1985] IR 532. 
15
 Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at p 2. 
16
 Limits including, inter alia, the Article 42.5 limits (see below) and in exceptional cases such as 
in the case of Baby Janice (unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004) (see below at p 7). 
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Constitutional Provisions on Education 
 
The Constitution makes its most explicit references to children in Article 42 
which is entitled ―Education‖. Article 42.4 guarantees the child free primary 
education and makes a promise on the part of the State to aid ―educational 
initiative‖ and to provide facilities where the public good requires it. However 
these promises are made ―with due regard… to the rights of the parents…‖ 
Indeed, the general language of Article 42 suggests that the Article should be 
read more as a consolidation of parents‘ rights (albeit in relation to their children) 
than as affording special rights and protections to children.  
 
Only Article 42.5 deviates from the rest of the Article‘s parental autonomy focus 
in that it provides that the state will supply the place of the parents ―for 
exceptional reasons, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their 
duty towards their children‖. This would appear to be a vital provision as regards 
the protection of children. Nevertheless, the superior courts appear to have 
settled on a restrictive reading of this subsection. This development will be 
addressed in more detail in section C of this chapter. 
 
As already mentioned, the Constitution regards ‗the family‘ as the marital family 
only. Consequently, many of the aforementioned ostensible protections afforded 
to marital children are not likely apply to non-marital children. It appears that 
natural parents have no rights in respect of their non-marital children under 
 8 
Articles 41 and 42
17
. As such, there is no barrier to state intrusion similar to 
Article 42.5 and the child‘s best interests takes precedence in such cases18. 
However, Hogan and Whyte argue that it is ―scarcely possible that the 
Constitution affords less protection to the autonomy of a stable non-marital 
family than it does to that of its marital counterpart.‖ They argue that in such 
circumstances the state would surely be limited by Article 42.5. Nevertheless, for 
authority, the authors can only draw on ―an echo of this sentiment‖19 drawn from 
the case of Eastern Health Board v MK
20
. At best, the Constitution is unclear as 
regards to the protections available for non-marital children.  
 
Other Provisions 
 
The rights of the child are explicitly mentioned in two other provisions, neither 
of which warrant serious attention in the current context. Article 44.2.4° provides 
that a child has a right not to receive religious instruction at a school if it receives 
public funds. This provision is of limited importance in several respects. Firstly, 
this merely protects the child from direct instruction rather than from influence 
from the religious ethos of the school
21
. Secondly, it might be seen as effectively 
a further parental right to control their child‘s religious instruction. Even if 
Article 44.2.4° was to be seen as providing a child‘s right, it is hardly a 
                                                 
17
 Per gavan Duffy J in Re M, an Infant [1946] IR 334 at 334. However the natural mother does 
have rights pursuant to Article 40.3 as laid down in State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála [1966] 
IR 567 at 664. The position of the natural father is less secure and less legally certain, see JM 
Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth Edition, 
Dublin, 2003 at p 1910.  
18
 Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at pp 5-69. 
19
 JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth 
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at p 1916. 
20
 Eastern Health Board v MK [1999] 2 IR 99 at 117-118. 
21
 JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth 
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at p 2068. 
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substantial one. Furthermore, it has only been invoked in one case
22
 to date 
according to the author‘s of Kelly‘s The Irish Constitution23. Moreover, in that 
case, it was invoked by a parent rather than a child. 
 
The child is also mentioned in Article 45 where the state pledges to protect 
children from abuse and from being forced to enter into avocations unsuited to 
their sex, age or strength
24
. The Article explicitly states that the provisions are to 
be of ―general guidance‖ to the Oireachtas and to be not cognisable by any court. 
The Supreme Court and the courts in general are undecided as to whether these 
provisions can be referenced in courts
25
. Furthermore, the rights afforded would 
seem to be self-evident and the protections are better provided elsewhere in the 
Constitution. It should perhaps be noted that the directive principles of social 
policy were influential in upholding the constitutionality of child labour laws
26
.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Therefore, explicit children‘s rights or protections do not appear in any 
substantial way in the Constitution. The mentions of explicit non-marital 
children‘s rights are even less noticeable. However, the caselaw holds that the 
constitution provides unenumerated children‘s rights for marital and non-marital 
children and, therefore, it is to this jurisprudence that we now turn. 
 
                                                 
22
 Campaign to Separate Church and State v Minister for Education [1998] 2 ILRM 81. 
23
 JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth 
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at p 2068.  
24
 Article 45.4.2° 
25
 Compare, for example, the different approaches in Attorney General v Paperlink [1984] ILRM 
373 and Kerry Co-op Creameries Ltd v An Bord Bainne [1990] ILRM 664. 
26
 See Landers v Attorney General [1973] 109 ILTR at 6. 
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C. Unenumerated Constitutional Protections 
 
Introduction 
 
As already mentioned, Article 40 of the Constitution does not explicitly reference 
the child. However, it is now settled law that the child has certain unenumerated 
rights emanating from Article 40.3 of the Constitution. While these rights have 
been espoused by the superior courts on numerous occasions, the most 
authoritative statement comes from G v Bord Uchtála
27
 and especially O‘Higgins 
CJ‘s dissent in that case. The then Chief Justice stated that: ―Having been born, 
the child has the right to be fed and to live, to be reared and educated, to have the 
opportunity of working and of realising his or her full personality and dignity as 
a human being.‖28 This statement of the law was approved by the Supreme Court 
in North Western Health Board v HW and CW
29
 and, in M v M
30
, Murphy J 
confirmed that such rights extended to non-marital children.  
 
Issues of Jurisdiction 
 
However the fact that children are recognised as having rights is not enough to 
ensure the enforcement of their rights. The problem is that in many cases the 
child will be too young to enforce his own rights. Moreover, in many cases the 
child‘s rights can only be exercised by third parties or their parents who may be 
the parties who are infringing the child‘s rights. Consequently, the area of child 
                                                 
27
 G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32. 
28
 Ibid at 55-56. Walsh and Parke JJ also made statements to similar effect.  
29
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. For example, the judgment of Mrs 
Justice Denham at 719. 
30
 M v M (unreported, 2 December 1982, High Court). 
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protection is plagued by issues of jurisdiction and potentially further complicated 
by separation of powers concerns.  
 
Crucially, it seems that the Constitution is not structured to overcome this 
problem. As Hardiman J cogently argued in North Western Health Board v HW 
and CW
31, the state may only intervene to vindicate Article 40.3 rights ―by its 
laws‖32. He cited33 the following quote from Kenny J in Crowley v Ireland34 with 
approval: ―It is not a general obligation to defend and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen. It is a duty to do so by its laws, for it is through laws and by 
laws that the State expresses the will of the people who are the ultimate 
authority‖35. Therefore, in many cases, children‘s Article 40.3 rights will go 
unenforced, absent any law providing for their enforcement. While state actors 
might have general statutory obligations to protect children
36
, absent specific 
legislation, their ability to carry this obligation through legally may be inhibited 
by the constitutional deference given to the marital family
37
.  
 
In HW and CW
38
, Mrs Justice Denham suggested – obiter – that such judicial 
intervention might occur in the case of a medical or surgical procedure in relation 
to a threat to life or serious injury
39
. This suggests that the courts can intervene in 
                                                 
31
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. 
32
 Ibid at 759. 
33
 Ibid at 759. 
34
 Crowley v Ireland [1980] IR 102. 
35
 Ibid at 130. 
36
 Such as under the s. 3(1) of the Child Care Act, 1991: ―It shall be a function of every health 
board to promote the welfare of children in its area who are not receiving adequate care and 
protection.‖  
37
 As, for example in North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622 where the fact 
that the law did not make the PKU test compulsory meant that the Health Board had no 
cognisance to supplant the judgment of the parents.  
38
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. 
39
 Ibid at 727. 
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such a way in exceptional circumstances. This has now been established by the 
case of Baby Janice
40
 which illustrates that the courts can intervene in such a 
way in exceptional circumstances. However it is notable that the intervention in 
that case involved making the child a ward of court
41
. The fact that the court felt 
compelled to use this procedure rather than any constitutional norm suggests the 
impotence of the latter. Furthermore the judgment was ex tempore and is the only 
judicial authority in the form of a ratio decidendi that we can rely on for this 
proposition. Consequently, the circumstances in which the courts will intervene 
remain somewhat unclear.  
 
Restrictive Interpretation of Article 42.5 
 
It has been argued
42
 that authorities such as G
43
 represented a constitutional order 
in which the rights of children could be adequately protected and that the courts 
have subsequently retreated from this position unnecessarily. However it should 
be noted that O‘Higgins CJ‘s judgment was a minority one. Indeed, in TD v 
Minister for Education
44
, Chief Justice Keane referred to this fact and was 
noticeably reluctant to explicitly approve the dicta
45
. Moreover, the majority in 
                                                 
40
 Baby Janice (unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004). In that case the mother had signed a 
consent for the unqualified use of blood and blood products but following an intervention from 
her Jehovah's Witness community she had had withdrawn it. An urgent application was brought 
before High Court where President Mr Justice Finnegan ordered that Janice be made a ward of 
court and authorised the hospital to provide medical treatment as it deemed appropriate. As a 
result of the court's intervention Janice had undergone major heart surgery on March 19th. 
Although given a 50:50 chance of survival she had recovered well. [‗Court Extends Order for 
Heart Surgery Baby’, Irish Times, Friday 6 August 2004]. 
41
 ‗Court Extends Order for Heart Surgery Baby’, Irish Times, Friday 6 August 2004. 
42
 See, for example, Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at p. 6, and, Dr 
Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: Running 
to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19. 
43
 G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32. 
44
 TD v Minister for Education [2001] 4 IR 259. 
45
 ―In his judgment, Murphy J points out that the proposition there laid down by the learned Chief 
Justice was not expressly assented to by a majority of the court. It is also clear that the passage in 
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G
46
 have not subsequently been overruled and it would seem that the best 
interpretation might be that, in essence, the courts have implicitly accepted the 
dicta of O‘Higgins CJ while not doubting the majority‘s ratio decidendi in G47. In 
any event, in Re JH, an infant
48
, the Supreme Court adopted what can only be 
interpreted as a restrictive approach to the interpretation of Article 42.5 and child 
protection generally.  
 
Re JH, an infant
49
 concerned an adoption process where the full final consent had 
not been given by the natural mother. The parents had married so, unlike G
50
, the 
applicants could not obtain an order under s.3 of the Adoption Act, 1974 to 
dispense with the refusal to consent. The adoptive parents were successful in 
defending the claim in the High Court but the Supreme Court found for the 
natural parents. The child had been with the adoptive parents for two years by the 
time the case reached the Supreme Court. Finlay CJ delivered the judgment of 
the court and what has been accepted as the authoritative statement of the law
51
. 
He argued that there was a constitutional presumption that the best interests of 
the child would be best secured in the marital family. Therefore, the Chief Justice 
concluded, statutes like the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 would have to be 
read in light of this presumption. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
question is an application to the particular case of children of the doctrine of unenumerated rights 
first laid down by the High Court and endorsed by this court in Ryan v Attorney General… 
Whether the formulation adopted by Kenny J is an altogether satisfactory guide to the 
identification of such rights is at least debatable.‖ Per Keane CJ in TD v Minister for Education 
[2001] 4 IR 259 at 281. 
46
 G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32. 
51
 Statement of the law accepted by the Supreme Court in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374. 
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This presumption could only be rebutted in two situations, namely where ―there 
are compelling reasons why this cannot be achieved, or unless the court is 
satisfied that the evidence establishes an exceptional case where the parents have 
failed to provide education for the child and to continue to fail to provide 
education for the child for moral or physical reasons.‖52 The latter situation is 
effectively the Article 42.5 situation where the state takes the place of parents 
where they have failed in their parental obligations. The former represented a 
new situation where the state could supply the place of the parents, namely where 
there were compelling reasons that this should be done. It was not entirely clear 
from the judgment what this new situation amounted to but subsequent 
judgments have expanded upon it.  
 
This ―compelling reasons‖ exception potentially represented the adoption of a 
more flexible approach to child protection. As Casey noted, ―Presumably it [the 
constitutional basis for the exception] springs from an acceptance that a child has 
constitutional rights just as parents do… and that in a case of conflict there is no 
rule giving parental rights primacy.‖53 Casey suggested that there was subsequent 
authority for this proposition
54. However the ―compelling reasons‖ test has been 
interpreted as being applicable only ―in the most extreme circumstances‖55 and 
the authors of Kelly conclude that ―the actual outcome reaffirms the adult-
                                                 
52
 Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375 at 395. 
53
 James Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell, Third Edition, 
Dublin, 2000 at p 632. 
54
 For example, Walsh J in G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32 at 78. 
55
 ―Yet the test set by Finlay C.J. in his judgment – compelling reasons why the child‘s welfare 
could not be achieved within the natural family – is so exacting that it would be difficult to see it 
being met other than in the most extreme circumstances. This is particularly so when the test is 
given the added weight of being set in the context of the constitutional declaration of the rights of 
the family and of parents, and the related constitutional presumption that the welfare of the child 
is to be found within the family [emphasis added].‖ Per McGuinness J in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 
374 at 496. 
 15 
orientated approach of earlier cases.‖56 This conclusion is corroborated by the 
restrictive reading of Article 42.5 by the Supreme Court in State (Doyle) v 
Minister for Education
57
.  
 
In his excellent analysis of the decision
58
, William Duncan has suggested that Re 
JH, an infant
59
 represented judicial re-assertion of the focus on parental 
autonomy following controversy over the development of an ostensibly child-
centred jurisprudence
60
 in the late 1970s and early 1980s started by the case of M 
v Bord Uchtála
6162
.  He claims that it was never clear how much judicial support 
the jurisprudence had and that Re JH
63
 confirmed that it had little support in the 
Supreme Court
64
.  
 
Expanding the Scope of Article 42.5 
 
However, despite Re JH, an infant
65
, it has been argued
66
 that there is still scope 
for a more child-centred reading of Article 42.5. The most authoritative locus for 
this argument is the Supreme Court case of In Re 26 and the Adoption (No. 2) 
                                                 
56
 JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth 
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1925. 
57
 State (Doyle) v Minister for Education [1989] ILRM 277. 
58
 In WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ 
59
 Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375 
60
 Including the cases of J v D SC (unreported, 22 June 1977) and PW v AW (Unreported, High 
Court, 21 April 1980). 
61
 M v Bord Uchtála [1977] IR 287. 
62
 WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ at p 
76. 
63
 Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375. 
64
 WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ at p 
76. 
65
 Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375. 
66
 See JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
Fourth Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1926-1927. 
 16 
Bill, 1987
67
. Here, Finlay CJ – giving the judgment of the court – held that 
Article 42.5 did not merely oblige the State to supply the place of the parents in 
regard to education but also compelled the State to satisfy ―the parental duty to 
cater for the other personal rights of the child.‖68 The court also deviated from 
the previous decision of Doyle
69
 in that it accepted that Article 42.5 allowed for 
legislation that would work on the basis of a permanent surrender of parents‘ 
rights
70
.  
 
It is now settled law that Article 42.5 covers more than simply the education 
rights of children. However, the decision is also cited in support of arguments 
that the Constitution can support a more child centred rights approach than the 
current one, a proposition that will now be assessed. Shannon also highlights the 
Supreme Court case of Southern Health Board v CH
71
 to highlight a more child-
centred jurisprudence emerging however the author accepts that this was rolled 
back in HW v CW
72
. 
 
Arguments for a More Child-Centred Interpretation of the Constitution 
 
Both Conor O‘Mahony73 and Hogan & Whyte74 cite the case of PW v AW75. In 
that case, Ellis J. refused to grant custody of a child to a mother with psychiatric 
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69
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Journal of Family Law, (2004) 7(3) IJFL 3. 
74
 JM Hogan & GF Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Fourth 
Edition, Dublin, 2003 at pp 1928. 
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problems, finding that the child had natural rights by virtue of Article 41 that 
were inalienable and imprescriptible. He felt that one of those rights was the right 
to have his welfare regarded as the paramount consideration in disputes as to his 
custody. Viewed in the wider context of the jurisprudence on the matter, PW v 
AW
76
, which predates Re JH
77
 now seems of little authority. Furthermore, the 
reasoning behind Ellis J‘s decision was explicitly criticised by Hardiman J. in 
North Western Health Board v HW and CW
78
. He felt the decision was both 
conceptually questionable and inconsistent with the law laid down in Re JH
7980
.  
 
Regardless, Hogan and Whyte
81
 somewhat ambitiously argue that ―the principal 
value of Ellis J‘s decision in the present context is that it indicates how a more 
balanced approach to the more complex area of custody disputes… can be 
achieved without re-evaluating the constitutional principles involved and without 
the necessity of a constitutional amendment‖82. They also cite the disagreement, 
in North Western Health Board v HW and CW
83
, between Keane CJ and 
Hardiman J as to ―the state of the law in the aftermath of Re JH,‖ presumably to 
support their previous claim
84
.  
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This is a highly questionable assertion. Firstly, Keane CJ‘s dictum would appear 
to be of limited authority given the fact that his was the sole dissenting judgment 
in that case. Secondly, and as O‘Mahony pointed out85, the decision in PW v 
AW
86
 sits very uncomfortably with the pre-existing and subsequent caselaw. It 
was directly criticised by Hardiman J in North Western Health Board v HW and 
CW
87
 and not even mentioned in the recent case of N v the Health Service 
Executive
88
 which was also a custody dispute. These limitations in authority are 
only amplified by the fact that PW v AW
89
 was a High Court decision. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that PW v AW
90
 could be used as reliable authority 
for the argument that the courts could yet mould the Constitution into a more 
child-centred approach. As O‘Mahony put it, ―Ellis J.'s statement in isolation 
fails to elevate this aspect of the principle [the welfare principle] to the 
constitutional plane.‖91  
 
O‘Mahony92 presents the argument that common law authority could be used to 
support a more child-centred jurisprudence. He cites the English case of 
Humphrys v Polack
93
 where it was held that rights given to parents regarding 
their children are entirely to be used for the benefit of the relevant children and 
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not the parents
94
. He notes that the statement was cited with approval by Gavan 
Duffy J in Re M (an infant)
95
 and Teevan J in State (Nicolau) v An Bord 
Uchtála
9697
. He then makes the tentative conclusion that the principle can 
―therefore reasonably be assumed to be part of Irish law‖98.  
 
While this may be the case in England, it seems unlikely that the principle is 
compatible with the Constitution‘s protections of the family. Moreover, it is 
notable that both Re M (an infant)
99
 and Nicolaou
100
 concerned cases of non-
marital children. One cannot presume that the statements would have been made 
in the context of the constitutional institution of marriage. Even if they were, two 
judicial mentions in isolation – that, in any event, predate Re JH, an infant – 
hardly provide an authoritative basis for O‘Mahony‘s argument. 
 
O‘Mahony also seeks to argue that the Supreme Court‘s finding in Re JH101 is 
conceptually flawed on what he calls a ―technical point‖102. He points to the now 
accepted principle
103
 that Article 41 creates rights for the family as a unit and 
does not create any rights for the individual within it. He then proposes that Re 
JH
104
 was flawed in that it attempted to give the child rights
105
 by virtue of 
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Article 41
106. However this argument would misrepresent the Supreme Court‘s 
argument. 
 
It was not proposed that the child was availing of any Article 41 rights as an 
individual. Rather, the relevant Article 41 right was the right of the family – of 
which the child was a member – not to be interfered with by the state. But this 
was not the only right accruing. Crucially, as Duncan has observed, the only right 
the child was afforded as an individual was his Article 42 right to be educated by 
the family
107
. There was no such technical problem with Article 42 rights being 
afforded to individuals and it was on this basis that the court concluded that the 
child had a right to be part of a marital family absent ‗compelling reasons‘ or the 
circumstances outlined in Article 42.5
108
. 
 
Duncan concluded that the judgment ―hoisted the advocates of children‘s rights 
on their own petard.‖109 It couched what were, to all intents and purposes, 
parental rights in the language of children‘s rights. While Duncan accepted that 
the Re JH
110
 standard did give some status to the welfare principle, he concluded 
that ―it does not afford it either priority or equal standing with the parental right 
to custody‖111 Ultimately, any parties to such actions who were not the marital 
parents would have to resort to the ‗compelling reasons‘ test, one which Duncan 
argued ―places a burden of proof on third parties which, given the uncertainty 
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inherent in predicting the effects on a child of a custody charge, is extremely 
difficult to discharge.‖112 
 
Judicial Re-Assertion of the Pro-Parent Approach – North Western Health 
Board v HW and CW 
 
Much of these arguments and the previous caselaw came up for consideration in 
North Western Health Board v HW and CW
113
 and a more detailed analysis of 
the case is of value. In the case, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the 
case of a newly born baby, whose parents had refused consent for a free, standard 
but non-compulsory (at least in statutory terms) PKU test which could test for a 
range of disorders which could be very damaging unless treated early. The risk 
associated with the test was accepted as being minimal to nil and the parent‘s 
objections were accepted as being irrational in the non-pejorative sense. The 
High Court had refused the application of the health board to obtain an order 
permitting them to carry out the test.    
 
Arguments that the Constitution might support a pro-child approach often draw 
on the dissent of Keane CJ in that case. The then Chief Justice cited PW v AW 
with seeming approval and was satisfied that Ellis J‘s application of the welfare 
principle was of general application and therefore was not limited to custody 
disputes
114
. Despite this, he felt that the constitutional presumption outlined by 
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Finlay CJ in Re JH
115
 was limited to custody cases and therefore was not 
applicable in HW and CW
116
. 
 
It is curious that Keane CJ felt that Ellis J‘s statement of the law was of general 
application while Finlay CJ‘s statement in Re JH117 was not, despite the fact that 
both cases were custody disputes. This is especially questionable since the 
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 (at issue in Re JH
118
) is explicitly stated to be 
of general application. Nevertheless, there is at least a strong argument that 
Finlay CJ‘s statement in Re JH119 only applies in cases where Article 42.5 is 
being used to completely replace the parents and that it is not relevant to a case 
such as HW and CW
120
. Having set out this base, the Chief Justice went on to 
outline the basis of children‘s rights under Article 40.3 and felt that there was an 
inherent jurisdiction in the courts to vindicate those rights
121
.  
 
However this was where the rest of the Supreme Court disagreed and case was 
effectively decided on jurisdiction and on the doctrine of the separation of 
powers to a certain extent. Denham J argued that the effect of Article 40.3 was 
not to create a roving jurisdiction. Rather, it existed to guarantee that the state 
vindicate those rights through its laws and as far as practicable. She felt that 
―the State has not chosen to use its laws – by enacting legislation –to protect Paul 
in the manner envisaged by Article 40.3.2‖122. Absent any jurisdiction under 
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Article 40.3, the appellants could only be successful under Article 42.5 and 
Denham J felt this was not an ―exceptional case‖.123 
 
Furthermore, she argued that the state was the default parent, not the super 
parent
124
. The learned judge felt that to order the test to be taken would be to 
effectively make the test compulsory and that the court ―…without the benefit of 
the kind of analysis and preliminary work which would precede legislation, 
would be making a policy decision for all children that this test be 
compulsory.‖125As such, Denham J hinted at a potential infringement of the 
separation of powers, even if it was not explicitly stated.  
 
Murphy J agreed that this case did not fall into the exceptional category
126
, and 
although he was frustrated with the attitude of the parents, he felt compelled to 
apply the law as it was
127
. Murray J (as he then was) also concurred, feeling  
that to come to any other decision would be to engage the courts ―in a sort of 
micro-management of the family.‖128 
 
Mr Justice Hardiman also argued that the appellants‘ case was inhibited, inter 
alia, by jurisdiction problems. He confirmed the previous statements that Article 
40.3 guarantees that the state will vindicate personal rights through its laws
129
 
and stated: ―there is no legislation on this topic, other than that referred to above 
[the Health Act, 1954] whose effect is to enshrine voluntarism and parental 
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responsibility.‖130 Like Denham J, he concludes that state intervention could 
therefore only be by way of Article 42.5.  
 
However, he further argued that Article 42.5 could not be used in the way the 
applicants intended and would not be applicable in this case since that Article 
was only intended to be used to fully replace the family, not to momentarily 
allow the state to take its place. He stated: ―I do not accept that the authority of 
the family or role of the parents is capable of subdivision in this fashion.‖131 He 
also mentioned the potential influence of the doctrine of separation of powers
132
. 
 
It is submitted that the case was correctly decided. It seems evident that Article 
40.3 only pledges the state to intervene through its laws. In cases, such as the 
present one, where the legislative and executive branches have not enacted laws, 
the courts cannot assume that it is within their power to vindicate rights. Such an 
approach could lead to a potentially limitless expansion of judicial jurisdiction in 
all areas of personal rights. While one might argue that the legislature would be 
prevented from making such procedures compulsory by the constitutional 
protections of the family, this is not a justification for massively increasing the 
ability of the courts to enforce personal rights.  
 
Moreover, the factual consequences of the judgment are not as egregious as are 
sometimes presented. As Denham J argued, the argument that the child‘s rights 
were being seriously infringed is at least questionable: ―There was no particular 
reason why this child should be tested for PKU. There was no relevant family 
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history. There were no circumstances which made it particularly apt for the child 
to have the test. The only form of the test offered was by way of taking blood 
from the heel of the child by way of a heel prick.‖133 Nevertheless, the result 
highlights how invisible children‘s rights can be under the current constitutional 
order, even when the case solely concerns children‘s rights.  
 
Confirmation of the Parent-Centred Approach – Baby Ann Decision 
 
Any belief that the Supreme Court might adopt a more child-centred approach 
was surely ended by the recent Baby Ann
134
 decision. The case concerned an 
adoption dispute with facts virtually identical to Re JH
135
. In the High Court, 
McMenamin J granted custody of the child to the adoptive parents who had been 
in custody of the child for most of its life (the child was 2 years old at the time of 
the Supreme Court proceedings). However the Supreme Court unanimously 
overturned the High Court‘s decision and awarded custody to the natural parents 
who had married since putting the child up for adoption.  
 
Hardiman J admitted that the appearance of the constitutional family in the case 
significantly altered the legal context
136
. Consequently, he reiterated the law as 
laid down in Re JH
137
 and concluded that there was a constitutional presumption 
that the child‘s welfare was best preserved in the family138. Despite her personal 
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reluctance
139
 to award custody to the natural parents, McGuinness J felt that Re 
JH test had to be employed
140
. All the Supreme Court justices held that the case 
did not warrant the state taking the place of the natural parents either according 
to Article 42.5 or the ―compelling reasons test‖. Essentially, the court could not 
find any physical failure on the part of the parents.  
  
The Consequences of the Constitutional Status Quo 
 
The Supreme Court decision in Baby Ann
141
 confirms the pro-parent approach. It 
highlights a presumption, at least in custody disputes relating to marital children, 
that the child‘s welfare is best secured in the marital family. This iron-cast 
presumption would only be rebutted in the exceptional situations detailed in Re 
JH
142
. Outside these exceptional situations, the courts would be restrained from 
basing their decision on any other consideration than the sanctity of the 
constitutional marriage. As Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O‘Mahony put it: 
―The striking feature of this case was not just its outcome, but rather the fact that 
the terms of reference available to the court to make its decision did not include 
what was in the interests of Baby Ann or what would best protect or promote her 
rights.‖143 
 
Therefore, adoption proceedings, where the subject is the child, may proceed 
without any consideration of the child‘s well being at least in terms of the 
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ultimate decision. This may result in the courts making decisions that are 
manifestly to the child‘s disadvantage. In Baby Ann144, the psychological damage 
the child could suffer was held to be a legally subsidiary issue in the context of 
the marital family.   
 
Outside cases such as custody disputes – where the courts are implicitly expected 
to consider children‘s rights – the constitutional protection of children is stunted 
by justiciability issues. The courts are not endowed with a jurisdiction to ensure 
constitutional rights are upheld. Rather, they have interpreted that the state only 
guarantees to vindicate constitutional rights through its laws and the courts have 
no role in making such laws. Furthermore, per Finlay CJ in Re Article 26 and the 
Adoption (No 2) Bill 1987
145
, the rights of children pursuant to Article 40.3 must 
be read in conjunction with Article 42.5. Essentially, any personal rights vested 
in the child can only be vindicated with due regard for the child‘s natural and 
imprescriptible ‗right‘ to belong to a constitutional family.  
 
Therefore, the rights afforded to children are often of little use, since children 
lack the legal ability to enforce their rights, and the state is often unable to 
displace the parent‘s authority. Therefore, while the Constitution guarantees 
children rights, in many cases it will offer no effective mechanism to enforce 
them. The state may, by legislation, provide for their enforcement but such 
legislation will inevitably run the risk of being repugnant to the constitution‘s 
protection of the marital family and therefore be useless.  
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Section D – Conclusion 
 
In the grand constitutional scheme, children are effectively relegated to a sort of 
second class citizen. The primary legal consideration is the balance between the 
state and the family. Child protections are limited by the dual barriers of a 
constitutional presumption that the child‘s welfare is best secured in the family 
and a constitutional limitation that means that children‘s rights will often not be 
enforced.  
 
Children‘s rights, whether they exist or not, are ultimately of little legal concern 
in many cases. Ryan argues that the caselaw has produced ―a legal framework 
that in its most fundamental form views children simply as an adjunct of the 
family, the object of an ideological struggle between the family, on the one hand, 
and the State on the other.‖146 As Shannon argues, ―It is only with difficulty that 
the law has advanced from its position as regarding children as possessions.‖147 It 
would seem ludicrous that cases concerning the welfare of children should have 
the balance between family and state as their primary concern and the interests of 
the child are at the same time relegated to a secondary importance. Surely the 
correct constitutional approach should not be about balancing state and family 
rights, but about protecting children.  
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CHAPTER TWO – CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
The conclusions reached in chapter one were that the constitutional status quo 
represents a correct interpretation of the law – at least in the technical sense – 
and that the superior courts are not going to advocate a more child-centred 
approach, at least until there is some substantial change in its composition. While 
the former conclusion might be challenged, one could not reasonably argue with 
the latter. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court was to take on a more activist 
and socially liberal form, it would still be required to overrule or disregard 
decades of Supreme Court authority if it was to advocate a more child-centred 
approach. Therefore, even a more liberal Supreme Court would be unlikely to 
adopt child-centred jurisprudence. 
 
Given this reality, the discussion must now turn to the Constitution itself and 
framing and philosophical inspirations. It must be considered why the 
Constitution was framed in the way that it was and what principles lie behind it. 
Furthermore, it must be questioned whether these principles are compatible with 
and appropriate in modern Irish society and if the Constitution is framed in a way 
that will allow it to act for a developing liberal democracy. The controversy 
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surrounding recent decisions
1
 and the numerous calls from academia
2
, political 
actors
3
, and members of the judiciary
4
 would suggest that the Constitution is not 
wholly appropriate to deal with child protection in the modern age. Therefore, 
the question is: whether the Constitution should be changed and, if it should, how 
it should be amended and according to what principles? 
 
This chapter will begin by examining the context and circumstances surrounding 
the framing of the relevant provisions in the Constitution in 1937 and the 
inspirations behind them. It will then address the impact of societal change on the 
provisions and their underlying principles. It will be argued that certain 
constitutional provisions and their underlying philosophies are inappropriate in 
the context of modern society. The aim is to show that any improvement in child 
protection will require complete reform of the constitutional provisions on the 
family as a whole. It will be proposed that liberal and secular principles would 
offer a more appropriate base for constitutional provisions on the child and 
family, and one more capable of generating a Constitution that is effective in 
modern society and in the future. 
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It is important to illustrate that, while focus should be limited to child protection, 
such a chapter will inevitably be forced to consider wider constitutional themes 
and issues. However, these themes cannot be considered in great detail and will 
only be dealt with in as much as is necessary to address the central issue of 
children‘s rights.  
 
B.  Framing and Underlying Principles 
 
Introduction 
 
An analysis of the framing of the Constitution and the underlying principles 
involved is a necessary precursor to considering any change in the philosophy 
behind constitutional provisions.  
 
As will be seen, the family and education provisions of the Constitution are 
heavily influenced by the principles of natural law. Since natural law will be 
dealt with in a more detailed way later on in the chapter, it should suffice for this 
section to consider natural law as consistent with a general Christian philosophy, 
and that its invocation signifies the influence of Christian ideology. As Hogan 
and Whyte observe, ―the reference to the nature of the state as ‗Christian and 
democratic‘ [in Ryan v Attorney General5] unmistakeably suggests a ‗higher law‘ 
approach.‖6 Furthermore, the invocation of natural law in the courts has 
generally produced rationes decidendi that are at least consistent with Christian 
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teaching
7
. It should be no surprise that, in this jurisdiction, natural law has 
manifested itself in a way that is particularly consistent with Catholic teaching
8
. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the Church of Ireland has recommended the 
removal of natural law references from the provisions on the family and 
described them as ―unhelpful and outdated in today‘s constitutional context.‖9 
 
The arguments of Mr Justice Hardiman
10
 and of the respondents in North 
Western Health Board v HW and CW
11
 provide an illustration of why a historical 
examination is necessary. Hardiman J agreed with the respondents‘ proposition 
that the general perception that Articles 41 and 42 were grounded in papal 
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encyclicals and catholic teaching is questionable
12
. It was argued that the Articles 
could have been based on alternative inspirations
13
. This section will illustrate 
that such opinions are at variance with the vast majority of academic and judicial 
opinion and most of the historical evidence and that they misrepresent the 
philosophical origin of the Articles.   
 
The Framing of the Constitution 
 
The framing process of Bunreacht na hÉireann was famously clandestine
14
 but it 
is widely accepted that the document was largely the creation of President de 
Valera and his small group of chosen civil servants. While we know relatively 
little about the process we can be confident that ―… it [the Constitution] was 
clearly very much Mr de Valera‘s own creation…‖15 However, de Valera himself 
was certainly in substantial consultation with members of the clergy
16
 during the 
drafting process. In particular John Charles McQuaid was in constant contact and 
has been described as ―…the single most important clerical influence on De 
Valera.‖17 
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Such as Professor Goldstein‘s. 
14
 See, for example, the account in Dermot Keogh, ‗The Irish Constitutional Revolution: An 
Analysis of the Making of the Constitution‘ in Frank Litton (ed), The Constitution of Ireland 
1937-1987, Public Institute of Education, Dublin, 1988. 
15
 JH Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979, Second Edition, Gill & McMillan, 
Dublin, 1980 at p 51. 
16
 Keogh, for example, notes correspondence with John Charles McQuaid (at p 28, for example), 
the papal nuncio at p 29, with Archbishop MacRory of Armagh at p 30 and with Archbishop 
Edward Byrne at p 31 in Dermot Keogh, ‗The Irish Constitutional Revolution: An Analysis of the 
Making of the Constitution‘ in Frank Litton (ed), The Constitution of Ireland 1937-1987, Public 
Institute of Education, Dublin, 1988.  
17
 Keogh, ibid, at p 11. 
 34 
It has been argued, however, that individuals such as McQuaid were not as 
influential as they are often made out to be. McDonagh
18
 questions the influence 
of John Charles McQuaid and argues that the draft was largely De Valera‘s work. 
He cites an interview in which he ―…took De Valera to suggest…‖ that 
McQuaid‘s influence was limited to Article 45.19 It has also been proposed, 
naturally, that the President was primarily motivated by an intention to avoid the 
wrath of the Church and to produce a Constitution that would stand up to 
ratification
20
. However de Valera was a devout Catholic, if not an especially 
conservative one, and John Charles McQuaid was a close family and personal 
friend
21. The President‘s substantial correspondence with McQuaid and other 
members of the clergy would seem to have been motivated by more than mere 
political expediency.  
 
Political Debate on the Constitution 
 
There was unusually little debate on the family provisions of the Constitution. 
Keogh notes that Fine Gael did not seriously challenge Articles 40 to 45 and 
were chiefly concerned with the presidential powers given the contemporary 
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political climate in Europe.
22
 When the Articles were discussed, children‘s 
interests were ignored and there was more concern about women‘s rights and 
about the impact on north-south relations
23
. Whyte argues that there would not 
have been much of a debate in any event. ―There was [in 1923-1937] 
overwhelming agreement that traditional Catholic values should be maintained... 
There is no evidence that pressure from the hierarchy [on the politicians] was 
needed to bring this about: it appears to have been spontaneous. The two major 
parties… were at one on this.‖24 
 
Academic Opinion 
 
The academic literature is largely in agreement that Articles 41 and 42 were 
heavily influenced by Catholic teaching. Garret Fitzgerald notes that the relevant 
ideology was ―…a particular form of Catholic teaching prevalent in the 1930‘s.‖ 
He further argues: ―over and above this [the divorce prohibition, special position 
of the church etc]… [catholic teaching] is visible in tenor and tone of the 
preamble and of the formulation of fundamental rights in relation to the Family, 
Private Property and Education[emphasis added]‖ .25 Fuller argues similarly: ―It 
is in Articles 41 to 44 that the constitution of 1937 becomes particularly Catholic 
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its thrust.‖26 The conclusions of Hogan27, Beytagh28, Walsh29, Browne30 and 
Hogan & Whyte
31
, amongst others, are further evidence of this consensus. 
 
Judicial Interpretation  
 
Judicial opinion reflects the academic position. In Re Tilson
32
 it was stated in the 
High Court that ―Our fundamental law deliberately establishes a Christian 
Constitution‖33. Similarly, Gavan Duffy J stated in Heffernan v Heffernan 34 that 
Articles 41 and 42 were ―…redolent… of the great papal encyclicals in pare 
materia…‖ In North Western Health Board v HW & CW35, Murphy J opined that 
parents were conferred a special autonomy by the Thomistic philosophy, ―the 
influence of which on the Constitution has been so frequently recognised in the 
judgments and writings of Mr Justice Walsh.‖36 These statements are not in 
isolation. The recognition of the Constitution as a Christian document has been a 
consistent and dominant theme in Irish constitutional law
37
.  
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The constitutional Articles on the family have also been particularly influential in 
their support of a natural rights theory in the Constitution. As Beytagh observes, 
Article 41.1.1, ―…more so than any other provision of the Constitution, provides 
textual support to the Irish judiciary‘s view that a natural rights jurisprudence 
was intended along with the specific protections outlined in the document…‖38 
 
Religious Inspirations  
 
The influence of papal encyclicals on the Constitution has also been widely 
observed. Quadragesimo Anno in particular, is often cited as here for example: 
―The dominant social thinking of the time, pre-eminently as expressed in the 
papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno… favoured ‗subsidiarity‘ – that the state 
should offer support or help smaller groups, including the family, but should not 
supplant them.‖39 Published just a few years before the drafting of the 
Constitution, Whyte saw the encyclical as inspiring a re-assertion of the 
previously dormant Catholic social movement, ―It would restore the state… to its 
rightful place, which is not to do anything itself, but to direct, watch, urge and 
restrain subsidiary organisations…‖40 
 
While Quadragesimo Anno seems to have been influential, the encyclical Divini 
Illius Magistri
41
 seems to reflect the constitutional provisions of the family more 
obviously. Certain sections of the encyclical are notable in their similarity to the 
                                                 
38
 Francis X. Beytagh, Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ireland: An American Perspective, 
RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 1997 at p 37. 
39
 Report of the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, 
Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006 at p 34.  
40
 JH Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979, Second Edition, Gill & McMillan, 
Dublin, 1980 at p 67. 
41
 Divini Illius Magistri, Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, 31 December 1929. 
 38 
provisions of the Irish Constitution. At paragraph 32 it is stated that the family 
has ―a right inalienable because inseparably joined to the strict obligation, a right 
anterior to any right whatever of civil society and of the State, and therefore 
inviolable on the part of any power on earth.‖ Furthermore, at paragraph 33: ―it 
would be contrary to natural justice if the child, before the use of reason, were 
removed from the care of its parents, or if any disposition were made concerning 
him against the will of the parents.‖ These statements bear more than a passing 
resemblance to Article 41 provisions. Paragraph 45 of the encyclical is 
remarkably similar to Article 42.5 of the Constitution: ―It also belongs to the 
State to protect the rights of the child itself when the parents are found wanting 
either physically or morally in this respect, whether by default, incapacity or 
misconduct.‖ 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Roman Catholic elements of the constitution are obvious in the explicit 
provisions and in many of the seminal judgments handed down since 1937. This 
influence has, perhaps, been most noticeable in the area of family law and child 
protection. The presence and judicial invocation of a natural law element to the 
Constitution has further bolstered the Roman Catholic slant to the Constitution.  
 
However, the confessional influence is more nuanced than a simple reading of 
the Constitution and constitutional caselaw would suggest.  It has been amplified 
by the heavy Christian orientation and substantial Catholic Church control of 
education and healthcare organisations. Indeed, as Kelly argued, ―…there is 
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equally no doubt that their [Articles 41 and 42] effectiveness owes something 
also to the Christian educational background and instinctively Christian 
disposition of the judges.‖42 
 
Therefore, families who could not be interfered with by the State, took their 
guidance from the Catholic Church. Consequently, the primacy of the family is 
intrinsically tied to the education provisions – this may be why they are linked in 
the Constitution – the ultimate aim of which is to ensure that the children of the 
nation were indoctrinated, through their education, as Catholics. Noel Browne, 
perhaps overstating the point, described the situation thusly: ―Inevitably, then, 
our teachers, historians, politicians, and journalists, our Cabinets, the electorate 
and, as a consequence, all our laws, have reflected fundamentalist, anti-
Republican, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, and reactionary attitudes fed to us by 
Rome‖43. 
 
It should, of course, be noted that the effect of the provisions was not solely to 
endow the Catholic Church with influence. The Catholic Church, and indeed 
other churches and religious organisations and obviously parents could benefit 
from the substantial deference given to families and the limitations on the state. 
This does not affect the central point however, namely that the constitutional 
provisions on the family were largely drafted to avail the Catholic Church and to 
forward Christian values.  
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C.  Societal Change in Ireland 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been shown that the Constitution, and the family and education provisions 
in particular, was heavily influenced by Catholic teaching. Moreover, this 
Catholic teaching was of the more conservative variety, generated by the siege 
mentality evoked by the fear of communism and the general will to set the nation 
apart from Britain and its perceived ‗immoral‘ influences. In this sense, certain 
aspects of 1930s Catholicism represented an exercise in nation building. This 
Constitution may have represented a legitimate base for Irish society in the 
1930‘s, however, Irish society changed noticeably in the subsequent 70 years. 
Despite the fact that the idea that there has been a substantial change in Irish 
society is widely accepted, and that this paper is a constitutional law thesis and 
not a sociological one, it is necessary for the purposes of clarity and completion, 
to examine this change to some degree.  
 
Early Change and Change in the Roman Catholic Church 
 
This social change, despite a common perception, was not limited to the 1990s 
and the beginning of the 21
st
 century. Ireland also experienced considerable, if 
not groundbreaking, changes between 1950 and 1989. The proliferation of the 
media challenged the monopoly on moral formulation, previously held by the 
Church hierarchy in Ireland. Television, in particular, had a profoundly 
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liberalising effect. The arrival of television also heralded the end of the age of 
censorship, if not initially then at least in the long term.
44
 
   
In every decade between 1920 and 1960 there was a substantial level of 
emigration. While this was to fluctuate during the 1960s and 1970s, it would 
resume in the 1980s
45
. This phenomenon exposed Irish men and women to 
cultural and social mores that were completely different to the Ireland they left. 
The employment opportunities of the British war economy exposed many Irish 
Catholics to the post-war liberalisation that their native land largely skipped. 
Obviously this effect was primarily experienced by the migrants who were no 
longer part of Irish society, at least in the short term, however the experience 
represented a further dilution of the isolationism. This is illustrated by the fact 
that Bishops in the 1950s lamented the ―leakage of faith‖ caused my migration46. 
Rural migration to Dublin also had a similar effect. Rural conservative attitudes 
were diluted with the more pluralist attitudes of the city
47
.  
 
However this change was not restricted to the public at large. As Fuller notes, 
even in the 1950s, members of the Roman Catholic clergy were beginning to 
think that change in doctrine was needed
48
 and this change was eventually 
manifested at a papal level with the advent of Pope John XXIII
49
. Pope John 
XXIII‘s 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra is highlighted as signalling a shift in 
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policy from restricting the state to emphasising social justice. ―Whereas previous 
popes had railed against state intervention in the economy and any development 
that smacked of a welfare state system, John XIII laid much more emphasis on 
the practical need for public authority ‗to intervene to remedy the lack of balance 
[in economies, parts of countries and even peoples of the of the world]‖.50 
Consequently, it might reasonably be argued that the current Constitutional 
provisions on the family are at variance even with modern Church thinking.  
 
This change in Roman Catholic Church thinking has arguably been mirrored 
politically. The decline in the influence of mediating structures in society – such 
as the extended family, the community and churches – has corresponded with an 
increase in the importance of the state
51
. This experience is indicative of a 
general phenomenon in western society as recognised by Edward Shorter
52
. This 
steady increase in the State‘s ‗parenting‘53 role is also noticeable in the area of 
education. Most notably, it can be seen in the extension of free secondary 
education in the 1960s and of free third level education in the 1990s. 
 
Modern Society 
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Therefore, even before the era of the ‗Celtic Tiger‘, Irish society had changed 
substantially. So much so, that Keogh observed: ―By 1987, the Ireland of the 
‗age of de Valera‘ was little more than a yellowed photograph to the country with 
the youngest population in Europe. In the year of Bono, the Constitution appears 
dated, with provisions at variance with values held in sections of the 
community‖54. The societal change since 1990 has been so conspicuous and 
widely observed, it hardly needs commenting on. A brief summary should 
suffice. 
 
The general profile of the Irish family is now far more diverse and varied
55
. The 
economic structure of the country has also shifted since 1990 and seriously since 
1937. From an economy dominated by agriculture in 1937, the vast majority of 
the population now work in industry or services with only 6% involved in 
agriculture
56
. While identification with the Catholic religion has remained high
57
, 
mass attendance has been dropping precipitously since 1990, with studies 
reporting that attendance dropped from 85% in 1990 to 66% in 1996
58
 and to 
48% in 2006
59
. The substantial increase in inward migration
60
 has also 
diversified Irish society and promises to continue to do so
61
. While immigration 
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does not in itself necessarily produce a more liberal society – although it might – 
it most likely increases the diversity of the host population. Consequently, 
immigration might magnify the need for a more secular Constitution
62
.  
 
International Obligations 
 
Ireland‘s ability to isolate itself morally and socially has also diminished since 
1937. Most obviously, this is because of the range of international obligations the 
state has undertaken and had imposed. Beytagh has suggested that a number of 
the fundamental constitutional rights appear in serious need of re-writing in light 
of societal change and EU and international human rights law
63
. Specifically, it is 
widely believed that Ireland is failing in its international obligations in the area 
of child protection
64
. Indeed, Shannon argues that ratifying such international 
agreements, without any intention to live up to them, may do children more harm 
than good by raising false expectations of progression in the wider public
65
.  
 
Conclusion 
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We have seen above how the Constitution and the family provisions in particular 
were especially influenced by Catholic teaching in the 1930s. It is widely 
accepted that Irish society has changed substantially since that decade and it is 
arguable that ―nowhere have the changes been more striking than in family 
life.‖66 As the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution concluded, 
―Public opinion moved [between 1937 and 2006] in a more liberal direction, 
reflecting the growing liberalism of ordinary Catholics whose behaviour drifted 
steadily away from strict observance of Catholic tenets‖67. 
 
D. Natural Law 
 
Introduction 
 
‗Natural law‘ is a broad theory or combination of theories which propose that 
there is ―a natural law of divine origin [which] is above human law, however 
positively expressed‖.68 Debate over the legitimacy, applicability and consistency 
of the theory has raged for centuries and one could not attempt to exhaustively 
deal with the subject in this context. Nevertheless, the theory must be assessed 
insofar as it informs a constitutional stance on the balance between parent, child 
and state. A discussion of natural law is further warranted by the fact that the 
doctrine is, arguably, implicitly invoked in the wording of Articles 41 and 42. 
Three of the five constitutional references to ―nature‖ or ―natural‖ are in Articles 
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41 and 42. This section will assess the value of a natural law base to 
constitutional provisions on the family in modern society.  
 
It should be of little surprise therefore that the concept of natural rights has been 
influential in the context of child protection
69
. As Martin notes, the interpretation 
of natural and imprescriptible rights has helped to ―tilt the legal balance in favour 
of the autonomy of the family unit to the possible detriment of individual 
members.‖70  
 
However, the legitimacy of the theory is questionable and it might be challenged 
as a unsuitable base for a Constitution in a modern liberal democracy. This is 
especially so in light of the changes in Irish society since 1937. Jeremy Bentham 
famously described the theory as ―nonsense on stilts‖71. HLA Hart summed up 
Bentham‘s position, ―Bentham both despised it [the concept of natural rights] as 
intellectually disreputable and feared when it was used in political controversy or 
embodied in public documents, regarding it as a threat to all government and to 
the stability of society.‖72 As will be seen, the theory can be challenged on a 
number of grounds.  
 
Vagueness 
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In making a half-hearted attempt to define natural law, Ronald Dworkin offered 
the following: ―though the various theories grouped under that title are 
remarkably different from one another, and the name suits none of them‖73. This 
quote illustrates a central limitation of natural law; it is often entirely unclear 
exactly what the natural law commands and its proponents rarely specify what 
school of natural law they refer to. This experience has been repeated in Ireland 
and the Constitutional Review Group concluded that ―no clear meaning of these 
terms [the references to natural law in Articles 41 and 42] has emerged from the 
judicial consideration of them‖74. While highlighting the lack of precision 
redolent in superior court judges‘ usage of the theory75, Clarke nevertheless, 
proceeds to assume what theory superior court judges are referring to and he 
summarises it as ―…a hybrid scholastic theory, partly derived from Aquinas and 
partly inherited from later scholastics through the intermediary of early twentieth 
century Catholic theology.‖76   
 
However even this assumed theory would not be satisfying. For a start, the 
teachings of thinkers like Aquinas are hopelessly outdated. His beliefs in slavery 
as natural and the subjugation of women could not be accepted in modern 
society
77
. Absent this base, natural law, in the Irish context, arguably amounts to 
nothing more the imposition of modern Church thinking. It should not be a 
surprise then that the application of the theory has resulted in judges delivering 
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conflicting judgments in the same cases ostensibly based on the same natural 
law
78
.  
 
Subjectivity 
 
The vagueness of the theory also diminishes the legitimacy of constitutional law 
in that decisions can be seen as merely the result of the subjective opinions of 
judges. Given that natural law can provide little specific guidance on important 
issues, it is left to judges to construe what the natural law would say. As Hogan 
comments: ―If the legitimacy of judicial review is to continue to be accepted, 
decisions in major constitutional cases must be seen to represent more than the 
personal opinions of individual judges.‖79 The Constitutional Review Group, 
considering natural law as a source of rights in general, concluded: ―The overall 
result is that reference to the principles of natural law, in the absence of a text 
establishing its principles, lacks the objectivity and precision which might 
reasonably be expected.‖80 
 
Democratic Deficit 
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Another objection is that if one accepts that the Constitution is infused with a 
natural law theory, this would represent a highly undemocratic system of law 
making. Laws and decisions are plucked, not from a law passed by the people or 
its representatives, but from a vague and ill-defined theory based largely on 
Christian teaching. Clarke argues that natural law has ―in principle, almost 
unlimited scope for frustrating the ―democratically‖ enacted laws of the 
Oireachtas.‖81 One would have to also question what authority has endowed 
judges with the ability to interpret natural law. 
 
While the references to natural law may be obvious to lawyers and legal 
academics, it is not certain that average citizen (in either 1937 or 2008) would 
appreciate the presence of this largely unseen influence. One would have to 
seriously question – if it was widely appreciated that the Constitution was 
influenced significantly by natural law – whether this situation would be 
acceptable to the populace at large today; indeed, one would have to ask if the 
people of 1937 would have accepted it
82
. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It could reasonably be argued that ‗natural law‘ merely represents a legal and 
philosophical smokescreen to disguise permanent Catholic Church influence on 
the laws of the state, an influence which, absent a referendum, the people are 
                                                 
81
 Clarke, ‗The Role of Natural Law in the Irish Constitution‘, (1982) 17 Irish Jurist 187 at p 188. 
82
 It should be noted that in Re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services outside the 
State for Termination of Pregnancies) Bill 1995 [1995] 1 IR 1 the Supreme Court stated that 
natural law could not invalidate a constitutional amendment not could it invalidate an explicit 
constitutional provision. In a sense the case affirmed the democratic power of the People however 
this does not negate the fact that natural law can have a substantial influence on constitutional 
law in the way outlined above.  
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powerless to control. Even if this were to overstate the situation, there would still 
be sufficient grounds to limit the continuing use of the theory in Irish 
constitutional jurisprudence on the basis that it is, inter alia, too vague, too 
subjective and too undemocratic. Indeed, Keane CJ seemed to doubt its 
legitimacy in TD v Minister for Education
83
. It is submitted that Ireland should 
adopt the Constitutional Review Group‘s recommendations84 and remove all 
references to ‗natural law‘ (such as ‗natural‘ and ‗imprescriptible‘) from the 
Constitutional provisions on the family. The presence and substantial influence 
of natural law on the provisions of the constitution is another illustration of how 
complete restructuring of the constitutional provisions on the family are needed.  
 
E.  Liberal and Secular Principles 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been illustrated then that the Constitution was drafted with a Christian 
philosophy in mind. It has also been shown that there has been a substantial 
change in Irish society, especially during the last 10 to 15 years. Subsequently, it 
was argued that natural law theories have been hugely unhelpful in Irish 
constitutional jurisprudence and that they are particularly inappropriate in the 
context of the family in modern Irish society. Mr Justice Walsh argued that so 
long as the constitution reflects the politics and social culture of the majority of 
                                                 
83
 ―Whether the formulation adopted by Kenny J is an altogether satisfactory guide to the 
identification of such rights is at least debatable.‖ Per Keane CJ in TD v Minister for Education 
[2001] 4 IR 259 at 281. 
84
 Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 336. 
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the people, ―…it is difficult to justify claims that a drastic overhaul is needed.‖85 
It is submitted that the time for a drastic overhaul of the constitutional provisions 
on the family has now arrived. The numerous calls for change in the last 15 
years
86
 lend support to this view. It will be argued that a liberal and secular 
approach to constitutional framing would be more representative of modern Irish 
society and would be more proficient at protecting children.  
 
This is not to say – at least not at this stage – that a more interventionist model is 
needed in the area of child protection. Rather, it will be argued that the guiding 
philosophy of the Constitution should permit such an approach if it was 
considered necessary by, and in the interests of, modern society
87
. While liberal 
and secular principles would form the basis of the new model, the model might 
well be child-centred or parent-centred, state-centred or family-centred, 
interventionist or non-interventionist. All that is proposed at this stage is that the 
constitutional provisions should not be governed by a somewhat anachronistic 
Christian philosophy and further limited by an ill-defined and unspecified natural 
law.  
 
Liberal and Secular Principles  
 
It is perhaps ironic that liberalism should be championed to provide a more child 
centred constitutional order, given the fact that liberalism is broadly based on the 
principle of limiting state interference. However, even John Stewart Mill – 
                                                 
85
 Anthony Coughlan, ‗The Constitution and Social Policy‘ in Frank Litton (ed), The Constitution 
of Ireland 1937-1987, Public Institute of Education, Dublin, 1988 at p 159. 
86
 See supra at notes 148, 148, 150 and 151. 
87
 An issue which chapter 3 will assess. 
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arguably the founding father of classical liberalism – recognised that, within 
liberalism, the issue of child protection was an exception to the rule. Indeed, his 
‗harm principle‘ obliged the state to protect children from injuries to themselves 
and by others, potentially including their parents
88
. Obviously, it is not proposed 
that classical liberalism should be the basis of the Irish Constitution, however 
modern social liberalism theory might provide a more suitable approach than the 
current one. A more secular approach might also avail the Constitution, 
especially in its ability to promote a more flexible constitutional order, one that is 
more suited to dealing with a multi-cultural and increasingly secular society. 
 
Advantages of a Liberal and Secular Approach 
 
The most obvious justification for adopting such an approach is that it conforms 
to the mores of Irish society in the present day. It also might be argued that a 
liberal and secular approach would be better able to adapt to societal changes in 
the future, changes which seem likely in light of continued immigration
89
. The 
shift in society from a more conservative, religious one in 1937 to a more liberal 
and secular one today has been observed above. This analysis is surely 
incontrovertible. The fact that some might argue
90
 that a change in the 
constitutional order might damage society should be of little relevance. The 
Constitution is intended to be a political document that reflects the will of the 
                                                 
88
 John Stewart Mill, On Liberty, 1859 in John Stewart Mill, On Liberty and other Essays, Oxford 
University Press, 1991 at p 14. 
89
See supra at note 208. 
90
 See, for example, the submissions of Amen, Brethren and Comhar Chriosti to the All Party 
Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 
2006. 
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people. It is not designed to be a moral code set by the religious hierarchy, family 
rights advocates and natural law proponents.  
 
Moreover, in principle, it is undesirable to have a constitution that does not 
reflect the will of the people. This undermines the legitimacy of the democracy 
and the people‘s belief in it and in its judicial branch. If decisions are seen to be 
drawn from natural law theories and a seemingly unalterable constitution, the 
people may become politically apathetic and disillusioned and generally sceptical 
about the administration of justice.  
 
It might also be argued that a constitution should avoid religious language as a 
rule. Gerard Whyte has advanced this argument
91
. While he believes that there is 
nothing wrong with using religious language as a frame –such as in the preamble 
– he thinks it is inappropriate to use it in provisions which will involve coercion. 
The family provisions, for example, inevitably will. Firstly, Whyte argues that if 
there is a secular argument for a constitutional provision, it makes sense that this 
should be the only one used since a religious argument might antagonise other 
religious groups and the non-religious
92
. Secondly, he argues that religious belief 
should not be used to coerce conscientious beliefs because ―…the proper role for 
religious beliefs in social and political discourse is prophetic, rather than 
coercive.‖93   
 
                                                 
91
 See, Gerard Whyte, ‗Some Reflections on the Role of Religion in the Constitutional Order‘ in 
Patrick Twomey and Jim Murphy, Ireland’s Evolving Constitution 1937 – 1997: Collected 
Essays, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998. 
92
 Gerard Whyte, ‗Some Reflections on the Role of Religion in the Constitutional Order‘ in 
Patrick Twomey and Jim Murphy, Ireland’s Evolving Constitution 1937 – 1997: Collected 
Essays, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998 at p 58. 
93
 Ibid. 
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F.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has proposed that not only is there a need to change the Constitution 
to properly defend the interests of the child, but it is also necessary to alter the 
constitutional provisions on the family in general. This is not to say that the state 
should be a more interventionist in its dealings with the family – the next chapter 
will assess that issue. Rather, it is submitted that it should not be assumed that 
the family is entitled to the constitutional protections it currently receives and 
that such deference must be objectively justified. 
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CHAPTER THREE – ALTERNATIVE 
MODELS 
 
 Section A – Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse the academic literature on how a balance between state 
and family, parent and child might best be struck. This is a substantial task as 
there has been a long-running and largely inconclusive debate on this topic in 
many jurisdictions. The aim is to draw principles and philosophies that could be 
used to ground a new constitutional order in Ireland as regards the constitutional 
provisions on the family. Some provisional points must first be addressed.  
 
This chapter will not be limited to assessing Irish literature. Given that the 
exercise will involve proposing a new constitutional model, foreign academic 
and judicial opinion can be as influential as domestic points of view. Indeed, they 
might be more valuable. This is because much of the debate in Ireland has 
concerned whether the Constitution should be changed in this area, rather than 
how it should be changed
1
. Nevertheless, the aim will be to concentrate on 
literature from jurisdictions with similar legal contexts, namely common law 
jurisdictions and constitutional democracies. Therefore, American academic 
literature – emanating, as it does, from a constitutional democracy largely 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, the submissions to the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, 
Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006.The submission process was largely 
dominated by a debate between children‘s rights groups and religious, conservative and family 
groups over whether Constitution should be changed or not.   
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composed of common law jurisdictions –  emerges as an especially valuable 
source of ideas.  
 
In addition to this, consideration of American literature has several other 
advantages. Firstly, the United States Constitution is silent as to the issue of the 
family and the child and, as a result, different models have been applied at a 
federal and state level. Furthermore, this has been accompanied by a wealth of 
empirical and other studies which has added a great deal to the academic 
discourse.  
 
Nonetheless, for obvious reasons, American studies cannot be entirely conclusive 
and the value of the American literature will be in its philosophical persuasion. 
This chapter will attempt to present these and other arguments, in the context of 
Irish legal, political and constitutional norms. 
 
This exercise should not be inhibited by the variety of applications that a 
constitutional change will have nor should it be obfuscated by the plethora of 
legislative labels and legal standards that exist
2
. It should be remembered that 
constitutional change will affect, inter alia, adoption cases, so-called ‗upbringing 
cases‘3 and welfare proceedings. The fact that some works concentrate on certain 
types of case in particular is not important as there is a central philosophical 
question to be addressed, namely; how should the balance between parent, state 
and child be set? 
 
                                                 
2
 For example, ‗abandonment‘ in Ireland or ‗neglect‘ in the United States.  
3
 Such as in the case of North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. 
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Section B – Domestic Proposals 
 
Introduction  
 
As already mentioned, the Report of the Kilkenny Incest Investigation in 1993
4
 
marked the beginning of a period which has seen a plethora of authoritative calls 
for amendment of the family provisions of the Constitution. The task of 
examining all the proposals would be too lengthy and in any event it would be 
largely pointless in that they rarely differ greatly and most have fallen by the 
political wayside. However two proposals in particular warrant detailed attention, 
namely, the amendments proposed by the Constitutional Review Group in 1996
5
 
and the 2006 recommendations of the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution‘s tenth report on the family6 and the resulting Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2007. 
 
The Constitutional Review Group 
 
In the context of the time in which it was published
7
, the 1996 Constitutional 
Review Group‘s proposals were especially innovative. Firstly, as noted in 
chapter two, the Review Group advised the removal of references to natural law 
in the family provisions
8
. Secondly – in light of a fear that the Constitution 
                                                 
4
 Kilkenny Incest Investigation: Report Presented to Mr Brendan Howlin TD, Minister for Health 
by South Easter Health Board, The Stationary Office, Dublin, May 1993. 
5
 Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996. 
6
 All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary 
Office, Dublin, 2006. 
7
 The Report of the Kilkenny Incest Inquiry notwithstanding, this was before there had been any 
widespread calls for or campaign to amend the family provisions of the Constitution.  
8
 Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 336. 
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stressed too greatly the rights of the family unit, to the detriment of its individual 
members – the Review Group also called for the unenumerated rights of the child 
to be expressly enumerated in Article 41
9
. Their proposals were especially 
progressive in this area as they included a recommendation that a provision be 
added to require the state to intervene to protect certain rights of the child.
10
 It 
was also proposed that the Constitution should be brought more into line with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child
11
. The Review Group also proposed adoption of the best 
interests standard as a constitutional norm
12
.  
 
These proposals represented a novel and progressive revaluation of the 
constitutional provisions on the family. The value of removing the natural law 
references has already been commented on and the advantages of providing a 
positive obligation on the state to vindicate expressly provided children‘s rights 
will be highlighted in the next chapter. The introduction of a best interests 
standard at a constitutional level might also be seen as a progressive development 
although, as will be seen, the standard has certain potentially crucial weaknesses. 
While the proposals of the Constitutional Review Group were effectively ignored 
at a political level and remain unimplemented, the report continues to be referred 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 330:  ―If a 
decision is made to amend Article 41 so as to grant express rights to children and also maintain 
an express guarantee of parents‘ rights and duties, it would appear necessary to expand the 
circumstances referred to in Article 42.5 so as to include a situation where the protection of the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of children require intervention. A re-wording of the State‘s 
duty to the child under this Article is necessary in the light of the Review Group‘s proposed 
amendments to guarantee expressly certain rights of the child and elsewhere remove adjectives 
and phrases which appear to refer to natural law which have been a source of some difficulties‖  
11
 Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 328-329. 
12
 Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996 at p 337: ―The 
Review Group considers that, notwithstanding the above legislative provisions [and Re JH], it is 
desirable to put into the Constitution an express obligation to treat the best interests of the child 
as a paramount consideration in any actions relating to children.‖ 
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to as an authoritative source. However, arguably, the Report of the All Party 
Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and the resulting Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2007 have effectively overruled the Review 
Group‘s findings.  
 
The All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution  
 
The tenth report of the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution on 
the subject of the family
13
 represented the first attempt, at a legislative level, to 
reform the constitutional provisions on the family. Unfortunately however, the 
report offered little to improve family law provisions to protect children. This is 
not surprising. The Committee spent most of its time examining submissions 
from a range of interest groups, most of which opposed any amendment 
whatsoever
14
.  
 
Such an investigation will inevitably be dominated by unsophisticated polemics 
and is likely to result in a compromise proposal that attempts to please all sides. 
An illustration of the limits of such an approach is the inclusion, in the final 
report, of a substantial quote from the Irish Catholics Bishops Conference
15
. The 
quote invokes the judgment of Ellis J in PW v AW
16
 to illustrate that the 
Constitution need not be amended. The use of this highly questionable authority 
                                                 
13
 All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary 
Office, Dublin, 2006. 
14
 All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary 
Office, Dublin, 2006 at p 17. It is regrettable that the new Joint Committee on the Constitutional 
Amendment on Children has also adopted this approach.  
15
 Ibid at pp 90-92. 
16
 PW v AW (Unreported, High Court, 21 April 1980). 
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in the final report of the Committee illustrates the limitations of a process that 
gives centre stage, and most of its consideration, to interest groups.  
 
Furthermore, unlike the 1996 Constitutional Review Group that was composed 
mostly of jurists, civil servants and academics, the 2006 Group was a 
parliamentary committee composed of politicians from various political 
backgrounds
17
. Moreover, the Committee reported just months before the 2007 
general election. The influence of political agendas and election concerns was 
always likely to be an obstacle to the Committee proposing any innovative 
reforms. Regardless of the cause, the Report provided little of note.  
 
The following was the Committee‘s conclusion on child protection: ―A new 
section should be inserted in Article 41 dealing with the rights of children as 
follows: All children, irrespective of birth, gender, race or religion, are equal 
before the law. In all cases where the welfare of the child so requires, regard 
shall be had to the best interests of that child.‖18 This is a hopelessly limited 
proposal. It promises only that regard will be given to the interests of the child. 
This guarantee is so weak that it would be very unlikely to play any substantial 
role in court proceedings. This is all the more true given that the Committee 
recommended the retention of the protections of marital parents and of the 
family
19
. 
 
Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2007 
                                                 
17
 Again, regrettably, the new Joint Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children is 
no different. 
18
 All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary 
Office, Dublin, 2006 at p 124. 
19
 Ibid at p 123. 
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The Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2007 roughly followed 
on the recommendations of the Committee. The 2007 Bill was also limited in 
several respects. It retained references to natural law; indeed, it added some new 
ones
20
. The Article was to be inserted in Article 42 and therefore had no effect on 
the rights conferred on parents in Articles 41 and 42. As such, the amendment 
provisions are constantly overshadowed by the provisions on the family and are 
probably subject to them. In any case, there were other limitations.  
 
Kilkelly and O‘Mahony21 point out the potentially crucial effect of the use of the 
phrase ―provision may be made by law‖ in four subsections22. They argue that 
legislation enacted under these provisions would surely be subject to general 
constitutional principles and rights
23
. This seems likely because, conversely, the 
potential alternative applications of the provisions are unlikely. Kilkelly and 
O‘Mahony point out that if the provisions are intended to render legislation 
immune from constitutional challenge, this would surely have been explicitly 
stated
24
. They suggest that any argument that the resulting legislation would form 
part of the Constitution would render the legislation in contravention of Article 
46
25
 in that it would amount to the legislature to amending the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
20
 Articles 42A.1 and 42A.2 both refer to the ―natural and imprescriptible‖ rights of the child.  
21
 Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: 
Running to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19. 
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 Namely, Article 42A.2, Article 42A.3, Article 42A.4 and Article 42A.5.1° 
23
 Including the various protections of the family. Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony, 
The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: Running to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19 at p 
21.  
24
 Ibid. 
25
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Article 42A.1 proposed to acknowledge the natural and imprescriptible rights of 
the child. Kilkelly and O‘Mahony pointed out that ―the provision almost 
certainly refers to the same rights of the child that had been found in Article 42.5 
in G v Bord Uchtála
26
, given the similarity of wording between this provision 
and Article 42.5.‖27 Obviously this would add little to Constitutional 
jurisprudence. It could also be argued that this provision would not change the 
position in Re JH
28
 where the child was considered to have a natural and 
imprescriptible right to be a member of the marital family. This could be seen as 
a continuation of the jurisprudence highlighted by Duncan
29
, whereby parental 
rights are disguised in the form of children‘s rights.  
 
Article 42A.2.1° does little to improve things; in fact, it could be argued that it 
makes matters worse for non-marital children. The Article retains the narrow 
state intervention standard of Article 42.5. However, as it is not limited to the 
context of the marital family, the provision draws non-marital children under the 
same schedule as marital children. Consequently, state intervention to protect 
non-marital children – who had been previously unaffected by the narrow limits 
of state intervention in the marital family – is effectively limited by Article 42.5. 
Eoin Carolan calls this a ―…classic case of levelling-down, rather than levelling-
up.‖30 
 
                                                 
26
 G v Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32. 
27
 Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: 
Running to Stand Still?, (2007) 10(2) IJFL 19 at p 22. 
28
 Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375. 
29
WR Duncan, The Child’s Right to a Family – Parental Rights in Disguise, (1986) 8 DULJ. 
30
 Eoin Carolan, The Constitutional Consequences of Reform: Best Interests after the Amendment, 
(2007) 10(3) IJFL 9 at p 14. 
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While Article 42A.4 makes provision to allow the best interests of the child to be 
a consideration in court proceedings concerning adoption, guardianship, custody 
or access, it only allowed provision to be made for this by law. In any event, the 
wording in the provision is weaker than in the similar provision in the 
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964. The state is only entitled to legislate to 
provide that a court will endeavour to secure to secure the best interests of the 
child. It is notable that the list of proceedings to which the standard applies is 
exhaustive and as such education and healthcare proceedings would not consider 
the best interests of the child in any way. 
 
All told, the Bill represents a mish-mash of policies, espousing none in 
particular. As Carolan has argued: ―[the Bill] does not evince a consistent policy 
on the family. It strives to be all things to all people, affirming and supporting the 
discrete rights and interests of children, parents and the family unit.‖31 Carolan 
goes on to point out that the problems that have arisen in this area have not been 
due to a failure to recognise the rights of the child, but due to the weakness of 
those rights in comparison with other interests. The Bill does not redress this 
imbalance in any substantial way. 
 
Section C – The Best Interests Standard 
 
Introduction 
 
                                                 
31
 Eoin Carolan, The Constitutional Consequences of Reform: Best Interests after the Amendment, 
(2007) 10(3) IJFL 9 at p 15. 
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The Constitutional Review Group
32
, the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution
33
 and the Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Bill, 2007 
all made reference to the best interests standard
34
. The standard is consistently 
advocated by children‘s rights groups and family law specialists35 and is used in 
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Therefore, 
it is distinctly possible that the concept might form the basis of a future 
amendment. However the best interest‘s standard is not universally accepted in 
the international literature. This section will assess the academic criticism and 
evaluate the potential benefits of the best interests standard. 
 
Indeterminacy  
 
In the first place, it is argued that the best interests of the child cannot always, or 
even regularly, be determined. The argument goes that the courts and expert 
professionals are simply unable to make accurate predictions about how their 
decision will affect the child or what the child would want. This is in part 
because of the obvious difficulties in making predictions of the future. It is also 
caused by the limitations in our ability to measure the psychological implications 
of particular decisions. John Elster argues that the best interests standard simply 
doesn‘t produce results in many cases.36 
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 Report of the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996. 
33
 All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary 
Office, Dublin, 2006. 
34
 The ‗best interests‘ standard generally holds that the best interests of the child will be the or a 
paramount consideration in legal proceedings concerning children. 
35
 See for example Geoffrey Shannon, Child Law, Thompson Round Hall, Dublin, 2005 at 45. 
36
 Elster, Solomnic Judgments, Against the Best Interests of the Child, University of Chicago Law 
Review, 1987, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at p 11. 
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Subjectivity 
 
A logical corollary of the argument that the standard is indeterminate is the 
contention that that it is also subjective. While highlighting the advantages of the 
standard, James G. Dwyer accepted that judges could use the theory to impose 
their own subjective viewpoints
37
. Bartlett went further: ―…the best interests of 
the child is a highly contingent social construction. Although we often pretend 
otherwise, it seems clear that our judgments about what is best for children are… 
the result of political and social judgments about what kind of society we 
prefer‖.38 It is not difficult for Irish observers to envision an example of how the 
best interests standard can represent different things to different people. The 
current interpretation of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 in light of the 
constitutional preference for the family represents just such an example
39
.  
 
Maintenance of the Rhetoric of Rights 
 
Many commentators
40
 have been critical of a so-called rhetoric of rights in the 
area of children‘s rights where the rights of individual parties are given undue 
concern at the expense of more holistic concerns. This concept will be examined 
in greater detail later in the chapter. For now, it should suffice to say that it is 
alleged that the best interests standard bolsters this flaw by attempting to give 
primacy to rights of the child at the expense of the rights of others.  
                                                 
37
 James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a Family Context – A Cautionary Note, 
Santa Clara Law Review, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053.  
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 Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, Yale Law Journal, 1988, 98 Yale L.J. 293 at 
p 303. 
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 For example in the cases of Re JH, an infant [1985] IR 375 and in Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374. 
40
 For example, Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, Yale Law Journal, 1988, 98 
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John Elster argues that it is unjust in this respect in that it fails to adequately 
protect parents‘ rights41. Over-concentration on the ‗best interests‘ of the child 
can prejudice parents who may have put in a great deal of commitment and effort 
into their parenting. Elster accepts that the child needs protection but qualifies it 
thusly: ―That protection should not, however, extend to small gains in the child's 
welfare achieved at the expense of large losses in parental welfare‖42 He also 
warns against making decisions on purely utilitarian bases.  
 
Self-Defeating Standard 
 
Elster argues that the standard would be self-defeating in that it would damage 
the relationships between children and parents. His argument is as follows: ―the 
best interests principle would create so much uncertainty among parents, with 
subsequent lack of emotional attachment to their children that the net effect 
would be to harm children in general. In addition there would be a strong 
disincentive to having children at all.‖43 He also argues that the standard would 
damage children by protracting and proliferating litigation, firstly, because the 
standard would be uncertain and, secondly, because courts would need more time 
to assess the more complicated best interests standard.
44
  
 
The first contention is admittedly somewhat stretched in that it is unlikely that 
the vast majority of families would consider it a possibility that the state would 
                                                 
41
 Elster, Solomnic Judgments, Against the Best Interests of the Child, University of Chicago Law 
Review, 1987, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at p 17. 
42
 Ibid at p 20. 
43
 Ibid at p 22. 
44
 Ibid at p 24. 
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intervene in their family, regardless of the legal standard. If they did, one can 
presume change in the law would be brought about. Nevertheless the standard 
represents a lack of trust in families and is likely to be seen as depreciating the 
role of families in general. From a parental perspective, it is anything but 
reassuring. It also hints at a utilitarian approach which is likely to be unnerving 
for many parents. The potential for increased and prolonged legal proceedings is 
a reasonable practical concern and one worth bearing in mind in an appraisal of 
the best interests standard.  
 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit also point out that the best interests standard 
promotes excessive concern for the child‘s physical best interests45. This, they 
argue, sometimes comes at the expense of the child‘s psychological well-being 
which is subordinated. The psychological interests of the child can often be an 
equally important consideration if not the most important
46
.  
 
Ignorance of Public Policy 
 
It is also alleged
47
 that the best interests standard can act against the interests of 
public policy. Specifically, public policy might demand that incidental 
characteristics of parents – for example, the sexual persuasion, financial 
resources (beyond a minimum level) or religious affiliation
48
 – should have little 
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 Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, The Free Press, New York, 
1973. at p 4. 
46
 This weakness seems to have been appreciated in this jurisdiction given the range of factors 
stated to be of relevance in s.2 of the Guardianship of Infants act, 1964. 
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 For example by John Eslter in Solomnic Judgments, Against the Best Interests of the Child, 
University of Chicago Law Review, 1987, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
48
 One could imagine how, in a Re Tilson [1951] IR 1 situation, the best interests standard could 
have, somewhat unfairly, tilted the balance in favour of the parent with the more socially 
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or no legal significance. Elster summarises the issue well: ―A society committed 
to the value of equality must often treat its citizens as if they were equal when in 
fact they are not.‖49 On a purely utilitarian analysis, the aforementioned 
incidental characteristics could achieve an unnerving importance. Elster cites the 
English case of S v S
50
 - where a mother was denied custody of her child because 
she was a lesbian – as an example of the extremes of utilitarianism in this 
context
51
. It is surely desirable that the sexual persuasion of the parent should be 
of little importance in custody cases. 
 
Encouraging Intervention 
 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit argue that the best interests standard mitigates 
against the child‘s best interests by overly encouraging intervention. They argue 
that the standard ―often mistakenly leads them [courts and state agencies] into 
believing that they have greater power for doing ―good‖ than ―bad‖.52 They 
argue that intervention is often psychologically damaging to the child – even if it 
is sometimes needed to prevent more serious harm – and therefore should be 
restricted. The limitations of intervention alleged by the authors will be 
addressed later in the chapter but it is only common sense the state taking the 
place of families is not an ideal outcome.  
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Criticisms in an Irish Context 
 
Obviously, many of the above criticisms would be moderated by the fact that a 
best interests standard in the Irish Constitution would be subject to the substantial 
deference and protections given to the constitutional family. However, herein lies 
another criticism. If the family protections and references to the child‘s 
inalienable and imprescriptible rights are retained, what effect would a best 
interests standard be capable of having? It is submitted that, in a Re JH, an 
infant
53
/Baby Ann
54
 situation, the presumption that a child‘s best interests are 
found in the marital family and the child‘s inalienable right to be a member of 
the family would take precedence over the child‘s best interests, even if the best 
interests standard was given constitutional status. This would be all the more 
likely if the standard was provided for by way of ordinary legislation, as was 
proposed in the 2007 Bill.  
 
In a case similar to HW and CW
55
, the best interests standard would have no 
application whatsoever. The standard would not overcome the jurisdictional 
concerns that the majority felt were the primary issue in that case. Moreover, as 
already mentioned, it was implicit that the best interests standard proposed by the 
2007 Bill was to be limited to custody, guardianship, adoption and access and not 
to have any application to such ‗upbringing‘ disputes. 
 
One could argue that the best interests standard could be effective if a new 
balance between state, family and child was adopted. However it is hard to see 
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how this could be achieved. If the family protections were removed, all the above 
criticisms would come into play. If they were retained, it is hard to see how the 
best interests standard could play anything more than a subsidiary role – to the 
family protections, the presumption that the child‘s best interests are found in the 
family and the child‘s natural right to be a member of the family – in the 
constitutional hierarchy of rights. Given the ‗natural‘ legitimacy and primacy 
ascribed to the family in the Irish Constitution it is unlikely that a best interests 
standard could co-exist in any sort of balance. Without it, the best interests 
standard can be reasonably criticised as being indeterminate and subjective, 
overly concentrated on competing rights, unjust, self-defeating and overly 
disposed towards intervention. One might reasonably contend that the best 
interests standard and natural law are in fact mutually exclusive. 
 
Section D – Rights Based Approaches 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite concerns over the suitability of the best interest standard, there is an 
increasing body of opinion that holds that constitutional provisions and family 
legislation should be more concentrated on the children‘s interests56. Even 
proponents of limited state intervention sometimes argue that the law is too 
concerned with disputes between parents and the state.
57
 The concept of 
children‘s rights is often posed as a resolution. The aim of this section is to 
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critique the suitability of rights based approaches in general however a particular 
emphasis will be laid on children‘s rights models. This focus is justified because 
parental rights are already enshrined in the constitutional order and children‘s 
rights are often held up as an answer to constitutional child protection
58
.   
 
Children’s Rights Models 
 
Some argue that children are best protected by tilting the rights balance in favour 
of children. These models give children the operative rights and relegate parents 
to parties of secondary concern. James G. Dwyer has proposed such a model
59
. 
He argues that the concentration on children‘s rights is justified by the fact that 
parents undertook their duties voluntarily and because the children‘s interests 
concerned are of more importance than the alleged parental interests
60
. 
 
Dwyer rejects traditional arguments that parents‘ rights are justifiably based on 
children‘s interests. He contends that it is not self-evident that there should be a 
connection between parents‘ beliefs and their children‘s beliefs61. Furthermore, 
he argues that models based on parents‘ rights encourage legal tendencies that 
ignore and forget the child and its interests
62
. Dwyer also asserts that parental 
rights are ―conceptually awkward‖63. This is because rights generally exist to 
protect a right-holder‘s self determination and personal integrity and do not 
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generally give power over another individual, the primary feature of parental 
rights in this context
64
.  
 
Dwyer is equally critical of arguments that parents are entitled to the rights based 
on their own interest, namely their interest in protecting their sense of enjoyment 
of parenthood. Three criticisms of this position are provided. Firstly, he proposes 
that the intensity of parental urges is not in itself a justification and, secondly, it 
fails to explain the anomaly of the existence of rights of control over other 
individuals. Moreover, he argues, talking of rights is unnecessary and privileges 
could be just as effective
65
. Essentially, his position is that parental rights 
―ultimately rest on nothing more than the ability of the politically more powerful 
class of persons to enshrine in the law their domination of a politically less 
powerful class, and on an outmoded view that members of the subordinated 
group are not persons in their own right.‖66 
 
Rhetoric of Rights 
 
While Dwyer raises some valuable criticisms of parental rights, his general 
contention that these flaws can be rectified by providing children with substantial 
rights should be questioned. This over-concentration on rights has been widely 
criticised and the idea that children‘s rights can adequately protect children is 
challengeable on several grounds, as shall be seen. It is argued that such models 
fail to escape the rhetoric or cult of rights. As Wardle puts it: ―They [children‘s 
rights proponents] see law as a secular Messiah, a cure-all for every social ill, a 
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big yellow social bulldozer that can shove away the old problems and build new 
temples of goodness.‖67 It should be noted that this is not to contend that rights 
are useless – indeed, they will be highly important in any model – but rather that 
they cannot provide the answer on their own.  
 
Overvaluing Rights 
 
The most common criticism is that children‘s rights approaches overvalue rights, 
ignore their flaws and the ways of thinking that they produce. There exists a 
perfect example of the limitations of rights in this jurisdiction in the case of 
North Western Health Board v HW and CW
68
. In that case the court held that 
even if the relevant right did exist, the court did not have the constitutional 
jurisdiction to enforce the right. Wardle points out that rights are often subjective 
and unstable and can be abused. Again, the Irish experience produces a case in 
point in Re JH
69
 where a right that ostensibly belonged to the child – the right to 
be part of a marital family – worked very much in the favour of its parents, and 
arguably against the child. In addition, as Carl Schneider argues, rights talk 
encourages us to think of what we are not constrained from doing rather than 
what we ought to do.
70
  
 
Undervaluing the Family 
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Wardle proposes that, in addition to overvaluing the power and effectiveness of 
rights, children‘s rights advocates undervalue the importance of the family71. He 
suggests that with reports of child abuse, premarital sex, family failures etc. 
―…constantly in the background… some children's rights advocates not 
surprisingly think that marriage is a failed institution and that parenting is 
untrustworthy.‖72 He argues that this is an inaccurate conclusion and that it 
ignores the majority of successful families that go unreported. The net effect of 
such conclusions and the resulting concentration on children‘s rights is, 
according to Woodhouse, that we ―…encourage families in trouble to atomize 
into units with independent claims of right, rather than coalescing around 
children's concrete needs.‖73 
 
Abdication of Communal and Societal Responsibility 
 
A further criticism of rights approaches in general is that they encourage 
isolation and ostensibly relieve the community of its obligation to protect 
children either by portraying children as having the necessary rights to protect 
themselves or by providing families with rights that protect against community 
or state interference. Woodhouse summarises this phenomenon: ―It keeps 
neighbours and even family at arm's length, excuses the community from 
accepting real responsibility for the plight of ―other people's children,‖ and, as 
Mary Ann Glendon asserts, ―it robs us of a political language for expressing our 
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collective stake in children's welfare.‖74 Insofar as it isolates families or allows 
them to become isolated, this leaves children more vulnerable to abuse
75
. 
 
Moreover, rights approaches obfuscate the role poverty plays in damaging family 
life. Huntington asserts that they fail to address the support families often need 
and ―foster conflict, rather than collaboration, between the state and families.‖76 
She concludes as follows: ―No amount of more careful calibration of those rights 
will solve the problems facing families in the child welfare system.‖77 
 
The Adversarial Process 
 
The allocation of rights to individuals within in a family promotes an adversarial 
process which has been particularly persistent in this jurisdiction. This process 
would seem to be totally inappropriate to dealing with many family law issues 
and this has been continuously highlighted by children‘s rights and family groups 
in Ireland. Ryan laments how it ―rewards vigorous debate, mud-slinging and 
point-scoring.‖78 Huntington felt that the over-emphasis had caused ―…the 
wrong kind of involvement in the lives of troubled families, resulting in over- 
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and underprotection of everyone‘s rights and a serious misallocation of 
resources.‖79 
 
Conceptual Difficulties 
 
There is also a concern that rights approaches in family contexts can be 
misleading and confusing. An example would be claims such as rights to family 
autonomy. This can be misleading and conceptually questionable in that the 
claimed right essentially relates to self-determination of the family, but this right 
will often be used to elevate the rights of certain individuals within the family 
over others. In the UK, the notion of ‗parental rights‘ has been abandoned 
precisely because of the conceptual flaws inherent. In 1982 the Law Commission 
contended that the term was ―not only inaccurate as a matter of juristic analysis 
but also misleading as a use of ordinary language.‖80 
 
Conclusion 
 
The foregoing should not be taken to suggest that rights – parental, state or 
children‘s – can be of no use in an alternative constitutional order. The aim was 
to illustrate that they can never be the sole answer. An Irish observer should not 
need to be reminded of the limitations of rights; they are well illustrated by the 
relative invisibility of the child in the Irish constitutional order, despite the 
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extensive Article 40.1 rights afforded to children on the basis of G v Bord 
Uchtála
81
 and other cases. 
 
Section E – Limited Intervention Models 
 
Introduction 
 
Another potential model for a reformed constitutional provision could be inspired 
by the so-called limited intervention models. These models generally maintain 
that the child is ―…at risk, dependent and without capacity to or authority to 
decide what is ―best‖ [for itself]‖.82 They draw on statistics that support the view 
that state intervention generally has a negative effect on the child and that, 
consequently, it should be limited. It should be noted that many of these models 
are substantially more liberal than the model presided over by the Constitution of 
Ireland. They are also far more focused on the needs of the child and draw their 
conclusions from objective utilitarian analyses rather than the somewhat 
unsubstantiated faith in the family that persists in this jurisdiction. 
 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 
 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit‘s 1973 work ‗Beyond the Best Interests of the Child‘ 
represents arguably the most influential and renowned limited intervention 
model. While their model is often classified as a limited intervention model, 
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many of their premises and conclusions would appear liberal to a degree that 
would be incompatible with Bunreacht na h‘Éireann. 
 
The authors enunciate several basic principles. Firstly, they portend to 
concentrate on the child‘s best psychological interest which, they argue, is often 
subordinated
83. They also undertake to make the child‘s best interests 
paramount
84. Despite this regard for the child‘s interests, the authors maintain 
that they have a preference for privacy and for minimum state intervention
85
. 
They state that this preference, ―is reinforced by our recognition that law is 
incapable of effectively managing, except in a very gross sense, so delicate and 
complex a relationship as that between a parent and a child.‖86 The crux of their 
theory is contained in three guidelines which will be assessed in turn. 
 
The first is that placement decisions should safeguard the child‘s need for 
continuity
87
. The authors present a series of potential negative impacts that can 
be made on the child due to a failure to maintain the child‘s continuity of 
relationships, routine and environment
88
. To this end, they recommend that foster 
placements should be ―as permanent as the placement of a newborn with 
biological parents.‖89 The authors recognise the potential value of adoption in 
this respect but they are critical of waiting periods, probation periods and 
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protracted processes in general
90
. They also criticise the potential delaying 
impact of appeals and unduly slow legal proceedings in the context of adoption
91
.  
 
The authors would doubtless be unimpressed with Ireland‘s adoption procedure. 
Shannon has described it as a ―rigorous assessment procedure‖92. The protracted, 
two-stage consent system is virtually destined to give rise to legal disputes
93
. 
Furthermore, the system espouses the arbitrary distinction between the standards 
applied to the adoption of marital and non-marital children illustrated by Baby 
Ann
94
 and Re JH, an infant
95
.  
 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit‘s second guideline is that proceedings and 
placements should reflect the child‘s sense of time96. They allege that children 
tend to find parental absence extremely overwhelming
97
. Consequently, judicial 
delay can be very damaging to the child. Noting the speed with which 
proceedings regarding blood transfusions
98
 can be effected, they propose that all 
decisions regarding child placement should be made ―with all deliberate 
speed‖99. To this end, they propose that, in adoption, infants should be legally 
placed with adoptive parents before birth and in general, before availability
100
. 
They also argue that the time necessary for a finding of abandonment/neglect 
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should be the time which would be relevant to the child and its perception of the 
need for outside interference
101
. 
 
Their final guideline holds that decisions should take into account the law‘s 
inability to make long term predictions
102
. They argue that the law may claim to 
establish relationships whereas, in fact, all it can do is give recognition to 
existing ones
103. Citing Bentham‘s ‗crude instrument‘ truism, they summarise 
their position thusly: ―It [the law] may be able to destroy human relationships; 
but it does not have the power to compel them to develop.‖104 
 
Incorporating their three primary guidelines, they propose the following standard 
to be used by courts in all proceedings as to the placement of a child: ―the least 
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child‘s growth and 
development‖105. They argue that this standard avoids the drawbacks of the best 
interests standard and conveys the fact that the child has already been a victim 
and should not suffer any further. The ‗least detrimental alternative‘ is to 
―remind decision-makers that their task is to salvage as much as possible out of 
an unsatisfactory situation.‖106 
 
The Advantages of the ‘Least Detrimental Alternative’ Standard 
 
                                                 
101
 Ibid at pp 47-49. 
102
 Ibid at p 49. 
103
 Ibid at p 50. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ibid at p 53. 
106
 Ibid at p 63. 
 81 
The advantages cited by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit in their principles and 
guidelines are convincing in themselves. Their preference for limiting state 
intervention as much as possible is a laudable ideal. It is surely preferable to have 
families conduct the majority of parenting and reserve the State‘s power to 
intervene in the majority of cases. However this preference is counter-balanced 
by an intention to keep the child‘s interests paramount. It is submitted that this is 
the most sensible approach. It balances the need for the state to respect the family 
and the need for the state to protect the child when necessary.  
 
The authors‘ guidelines also espouse ideals that would surely be beneficial in a 
constitutional order. The authors make good cases for the protection of a child‘s 
continuity and for the recognition of the child‘s sense of time. The relative 
weakness of the law in making long term predictions and dealing with the 
complex area of the family has long been recognised. These principles are drawn 
together well in the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard. However the 
comparative value of the standard is perhaps best illustrated by a comparison 
with the best interests standard and with rights based approaches.  
 
In the first place, the fact that the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard is more 
specific as to its essence and intent means that it is less likely than the more 
interpretive best interests standard to be indeterminate and therefore subjective. 
While the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard does place an emphasis on the 
interests of the child, it does so while retaining a preference for family privacy 
and limiting intervention. In this sense it obviates many of the disadvantages of 
 82 
the best interests standard such as the rhetoric of rights, the overvaluing of 
intervention and the undervaluing of the family.   
 
The standard also holds certain advantages over rights-based models. Again, the 
value of the family is emphasised and, by definition, the ‗least detrimental 
alternative‘ standard does not overvalue itself as a remedy. The relative weakness 
of the law to remedy familial situations is accepted. At the same time the ‗least 
detrimental alternative‘ standard does not abdicate its responsibility to protect 
children nor to support the family and the paramountcy of children‘s interests is 
espoused. Finally, in highlighting the need to provide the least detrimental 
alternative, the standard relaxes the emphasis on rights and, by extension, the 
emphasis on the adversarial process. 
 
Children’s Interests and Limited Intervention 
 
Despite the fact that many subsequent limited intervention models have 
nominally claimed to be in search of ‗the least detrimental alternative‘107, few 
have held the interests of children in the same regard as Goldstein, Freud and 
Solnit. Michael Wald, for example, claims society‘s political commitment to 
diversity of views and religion as a justification for limited intervention
108
. In 
setting his (restrictive) intervention standard, Wald, accepts that it might prohibit 
intervention in some cases where it would be beneficial to the child in the name 
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of the greater good of limiting state intervention
109
. To anyone concerned with 
child protection, this would seem to be an unacceptable concession. His agenda 
also becomes clear as he refers to anecdotal reports of state agencies coercing 
families into placing children in welfare voluntarily.
110
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that adoption of the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard would 
afford the constitutional order many advantages. It would be a more appropriate 
standard to govern the area of child placement under the Constitution than the 
current best interests standard (in the case of non-marital children) or the 
presumption that the best interests are found in the family (in the case marital 
children). The precise applications of the standard will be assessed in greater 
detail in chapter four. 
 
However it is important to be cautious when grouping limited intervention 
advocates together. Dwyer points out that it is common for limited intervention 
advocates to couch their language in terms of ‗family autonomy‘ and ‗family 
rights‘111. In reality, their agenda is often the protection of parents and their 
ability to control their children. Limited intervention models may well provide 
the best basis for a constitutional amendment however one should distinguish 
between those that seek to best serve children in addition to parents, families and 
                                                 
109
 Ibid at p 1005. 
110
 Ibid at p 1006. 
111
 James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a Family Context – A Cautionary Note, 
Santa Clara Law Review, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053. at p1062-1063. 
 
 84 
society and those whose primary goal is to preserve religious and cultural 
practices under the guise of family autonomy.  
 
 
Section F – Focusing on the Family 
 
Introduction 
 
It is noticeable that many of the above models adopt individualistic approaches, 
stressing the rights of certain parties over others. An alternative approach is the 
supportive theory which attempts to focus on helping families as a whole. This is 
not to be confused with limited intervention models that seek to prevent the state 
from interfering with families. Rather, this model encourages intervention where 
necessary, not to take children away from families, but to help families to 
provide for and protect their children. The focus is on helping families survive 
and prosper in spite of their problems. Consequently, state intervention is seen as 
a potentially valuable asset for parents.  
 
Problem Solving Models 
 
In her 2006 paper ‗Rights Myopia in Children‘s Welfare‘, Clare Huntington 
proposes a shift from rights-based approaches to a problem-solving approach
112
. 
She bases her argument on the widely accepted idea that foster care and 
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intervention is not the ideal result for authorities dealing with child welfare
113
. 
Her answer is to argue for a shift in focus from rights based models and court 
proceedings to a procedure aimed at helping families to solve their problems.  
 
Huntington‘s primary argument is that since poverty can often be the cause of 
parental failings and since the state is not doing enough to alleviate the poverty; 
the state has no right to intervene to take the children away from the parents. It is 
surely the case that parents, children and the state have an interest in preventing 
state intervention. Huntington argues that helping families is the best way to 
secure this. 
 
Central to her theory of problem solving and family aid is the concept of case 
conferencing, a process in which social workers, family members community 
members, professionals and in many cases parents and children convene in a 
conference to draft a plan as to how the child is to be provided for
114
. Case 
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conferencing, she argues, encompasses several important principles, namely, that 
a child is best raised in its own family, that families have that responsibility and 
should be supported, that families are capable of making quick decisions in 
response to changing circumstances and that they are experts on the solutions 
needed
115
.  
 
The Values of Focusing on the Family and Case Conferencing  
 
The value of the family in raising children is widely accepted
116
. Huntington 
cites many recent positive international studies of case conferencing systems. 
She shows that studies have suggested that case conferencing reduces subsequent 
abuse
117
. It has also been demonstrated that conferences produces plans in the 
vast majority of cases
118
 and that these plans often require more of a parent than 
an agency typically would
119
 and that participants report ―satisfaction with the 
process and result.‖120 The placement of the child, if necessary, would most often 
                                                                                                                                    
with a few changes) if it meets predetermined criteria. The coordinator writes up the plan, sends 
it to all participants, and then sets a time for a subsequent conference to assess developments in 
the case. 
The plan typically includes a decision about the safety of the child, including whether the child 
should be placed outside of the home for a certain period of time, and, if so, with whom. If the 
child is placed outside the home, she is almost invariably placed with a relative or other 
conference participant. The plan also identifies the services and supports needed by the parents. 
Finally, the plan determines which participants will both help the family and also check in on a 
regular basis to ensure the child 
is safe and the parents are complying with the plan.‖ Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in 
Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 
UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 676. 
115
 Ibid at p 676. 
116
 See, for example, the discussion in James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a 
Family Context – A Cautionary Note, Santa Clara Law Review, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053 at  p 
1054. 
117
 Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 681. 
118
 Ibid. 
119
 Ibid at p 682. 
120
 Ibid. 
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be with a relative. The process would also bring about substantial savings for the 
state
121
.  
 
Chandler and Giovanucci also give a very favourable review of case 
conferencing. They highlight the reduction in court caseload, the inclusion of 
parents and family members, the increases in transparency and humaneness of 
proceedings, the increase in the speed of cases and improvements in family-
agency communication
122
. However case conferencing provides further 
advantages. 
 
Maintaining Rights 
 
Insofar as case conferencing seeks to limit the influence of competing rights, it 
does not dispense with them completely. Generally, parties maintain the right to 
veto the conference and go to court
123
. Nevertheless, Huntington points out that 
in 95% of cases in the jurisdictions in which the model has been tried, there has 
been no need for court enforcement
124
. Therefore, while there is de jure retention 
of rights, they are effectively absent from the majority of cases. 
 
Dispensing with the Adversarial System 
 
                                                 
121
 Ibid at pp 683-684. 
122
 Susan M. Chandler & Marilou Giovannucci, Transforming Traditional Child Welfare Policy 
and Practice, Family Court Review, 42.Fam. Ct. Rev. 216, 2004 at p 218. 
123
 Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 697. 
124
 Ibid at pp 697-698. 
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The logical extension of the fact that there are fewer court proceedings is that 
there is less use of the adversarial system. As already mentioned, this has been 
consistently highlighted as a problem in Ireland
125
. The child is not forced to be 
the subject of confusing and overbearing court proceedings and is instead the 
subject of conciliatory, solution orientated conference proceedings. Indeed, the 
child might not need to be involved. This also aids the child in that proceedings 
are speeded up as court time is no longer a requirement.  
 
Addressing the Role of Poverty 
 
It is consistently pointed out that rights-based approaches fail to appreciate the 
role of poverty and other external factors in inhibiting the growth of healthy 
families
126
. A recent study showed that 14% of Irish children live in consistent 
poverty
127
. Garrison argues that poverty could completely inhibit the state‘s 
ability to solve family issues: ―Unless we reduce poverty and its related stresses, 
the least drastic alternative will remain an elusive goal.‖128 Focusing on the 
family and case conferencing could go some way towards addressing this 
imbalance. Huntington points out that even the change in rhetoric could have a 
positive effect: ―Changing the frame for the child welfare case could help 
reorient society‘s views of abuse and neglect away from the view that abuse and 
neglect are products of parental pathology, and toward a view of social 
                                                 
125
 See, for example, Geoffrey Shannon, Child Law, Thompson Round Hall, Dublin, 2005 at p 
246. 
126
 See, for example, Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006). 
127
 Central Statistics Office, EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2005 (EU-SILC) 
(Central Statistics Office, Cork, 2005. 
128
 Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decision making: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 
75 GEO. L. J. 1745, 1762-66 (1987) at 1828. 
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responsibility, where a broader group—both the immediate community and the 
state—claims responsibility for the larger circumstances that led to the abuse or 
neglect.‖129 
 
Case Conferencing and Problem Solving Models in Ireland 
 
The values of case conferencing and a generally more supportive model have 
been accepted in Ireland. Indeed, part 2 of the Children Act, 2001 provides for 
the procedure. Shannon observed how the process brings the focus on to family 
in that it represents ―a significant transfer of power from the State, exercised 
principally by the courts, to the community.‖130 He felt that the attendance of 
children was one of the most progressive elements
131
.   The concept was 
introduced in New Zealand largely to respect diverse cultural approaches to 
family organization. In this respect it could prove especially valuable in a more 
culturally diverse Ireland
132
. While the decision as to whether a right to a case 
conference should be guaranteed to all children in the Constitution – as it is by 
legislation in New Zealand – is beyond the remit of this thesis, the procedure 
would might well be inherent in any constitutional order that focused on helping 
families.  
 
                                                 
129
 Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 693. 
130
 Geoffrey Shannon, Child Law, Thompson Round Hall, Dublin, 2005 at p 421. 
131
 Shannon, Child Law, Thomson RoundHall, Dublin, 2005 at p 395. 
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 The substantial immigration in the last 20 years is predicted to continue. Several estimates 
have suggested that the current immigration rate will more or less persist. For example: ―The 
report [a report by NCB Stockbrokers] also suggests this influx of immigrants to Ireland's shores 
is not a short term phenomenon. It is predicted that by 2020 the population of Ireland will have 
grown from 4.1 million to 5.3 million. The number of immigrants will have risen from 400,000 to 
1 million and will account for 19% of the country's population. The NCB expects on average 
53,000 overseas workers each year to come and work in Ireland over the next five years. 
http://www.workpermit.com/news/2006_04_04/uk/immigrants_to_ireland_continue.html 
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Conclusion 
 
It is noticeable from the foregoing that much of the focus is on cases of child 
neglect and abandonment. This is likely to be the legal area in which the 
problem-solving model (elevated to a constitutional norm) would have most 
influence. Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that the problem-solving 
model would be entirely limited to such cases. It is possible to theorise how the 
model could affect adoption disputes and even cases of temporary state 
intervention such as the North Western Health Board v HW and CW
133
 situation.  
 
Section G – Conclusion 
 
Sections B and C illustrated how the majority of the recent proposals for the 
amendment of the family provisions of the Constitution have been 
underwhelming and would most likely prove incapable of delivering on the goal 
of child protection. In particular, the best interests standards is too often invoked 
as a reliable replacement for the current order. Section D also criticised rights-
based approaches as not having a sufficient degree of sophistication to be the 
ultimate answer to the problems of constitutional child protection. Therefore, the 
stated aim should not be to produce a constitutional order that protects the best 
interests of the child or children‘s rights. Rather, child protection should be the 
goal. To this end, sections D, E and F presented several models that might 
provide certain advantages. Chapter four will attempt to combine these models 
with the aim of producing a more equitable constitutional order.
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CHAPTER FOUR – A NEW MODEL FOR 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
OF CHILDREN IN IRELAND 
 
Section A – Introduction 
 
Chapter one illustrated how Bunreacht na hÉireann prescribes a jurisprudence 
that obscures the interests of the child and stresses the rights and privileges of 
parents first and foremost. It was also shown that this balance can be very 
damaging to children and that it can inhibit the state in attempts it makes to 
protect children. Chapter two presented the argument that our current 
constitutional provisions were influenced by a philosophy that is anachronistic 
and inappropriate in the context of modern society and will continue to be so in 
the future, perhaps more so. Chapter three assessed a range of alternative 
philosophies on which a new constitutional order could be based. This chapter 
will combine the efforts of the previous three by suggesting an alternative model 
for the constitutional protection of the child. In this respect, chapter four will be 
closely linked to chapter three. The aim is to draw from the philosophies 
examined in chapter three and draw their best elements into a combined model. 
 
Initially, several guiding considerations will have to be elucidated and addressed 
and these will be dealt with in section B. The suggested model will be dealt with 
in four sections. Firstly, the justifications for guaranteeing and limiting parental 
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rights will be assessed in section C. Secondly, section D will address how a new 
order could properly protect the rights of the child. Section E will examine how 
the limits of state intervention might be set. Finally, section F will draw together 
the arguments made in the previous three sections with the conclusions made in 
chapter three and attempt to draw them into a combined model. The potential 
applications of this model will be briefly assessed in section G.  
 
Section B - Considerations 
 
The Need for Constitutional Provisions 
 
It has already been demonstrated that there is a need to reassess the constitutional 
provisions on the family as a whole to properly protect children. This could be 
achieved by deleting the family provisions in the Constitution and delegating a 
full power to legislate in the area to the Oireachtas. The vast majority of 
jurisdictions broadly employ such an approach
1
. However, given the fact that the 
Constitution already deals with the family and the child, it is unlikely that such 
an approach would be popular. Citizens would most likely want a direct say in 
the formation of any new jurisprudence, if it was decided to do away with the old 
one
2
. Furthermore, there are several advantages to having constitutional 
provisions in the area and reasons why this would particularly practicable in an 
Irish context.  
                                                 
1
 For example, the US Constitution has nothing to say on the family or the child. Jurisdictions 
(such as the UK) that do not have a codified constitution do not have to consider the issue at all at 
a constitutional (in the conventional meaning of the word) level.  
2
 The 1996 divorce amendment supports this contention. In that case, the divorce prohibition was 
replaced by a specific set of provisions governing the conditions in which divorce could be 
permitted. 
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Firstly, the Irish Constitution has generally
3
 proved especially flexible and 
capable of adapting to new times and contexts. It would be regrettable not to take 
advantage of this. Secondly, if any change was made to make the family more 
vulnerable to state intervention, it is surely desirable to have the express approval 
of the people. Furthermore, Ireland is a relatively small constitutional democracy 
and consequently the national constitution is arguably more capable of dealing 
with such issues than in larger, more socially and politically diverse jurisdictions. 
It should be noted at this point that the aim here is to propose a general 
philosophy and not to exhaustively set out every element of a new provision. 
 
The Definition of the Family 
 
It is not intended for this chapter to deal with other issues regarding the family 
and the constitution in any great detail. However one issue merits some attention 
at this point. There has been substantial debate as to the definition of the family 
in the Constitution
4
. The courts have held
5
, and it is largely accepted, that the 
Constitution only refers to the family based on a heterosexual marriage
6
. 
Arguably, this fact can be damaging to children whose parents are in 
                                                 
3
 The word ‗generally‘ is included because, while the Constitution has been considered flexible as 
regards society and law generally, one might argue that the Constitution has not been very 
flexible in the area of family law.  
4
 See, for example, the submissions to the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, 
Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006. 
5
 See Chapter 1. 
6
 In light of this, the section 2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration Act 2004 specifically precludes 
recognition of a same sex marriage. This was recently confirmed in Zappone and Gilligan v 
Revenue Commissioners [2006] IEHC 404. 
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relationships outside this definition
7
. However, a full discussion of this nebulous 
and controversial topic would be outside the ambit of this dissertation. It should 
suffice to say that this paper will attempt to suggest constitutional provisions that 
prescribe that the family – however it is defined – is the ideal institution in which 
parents can raise their children and in which children can be protected.  
 
The Need for a Compromise Solution 
 
The American literature illustrates how new models are contentious and rarely 
universally popular
8
. However they are at least based on cost-benefit analyses, 
and not on a naturally divined belief in the ultimate authority of the family. 
Properly protecting families and children and the rights of parents demands a 
more sophisticated approach than the current one. As Dwyer puts it: “The child's 
situation calls for tailor-made solutions, not a one-size-fits-all approach‖9. The 
most obvious conclusion, given the extensive academic debate, is that a single 
philosophy will not provide the answer.  
 
The Applications of the Provision 
 
Perhaps the biggest limitation of the current provisions on the family is the 
failure to clearly distinguish between the range of situations to which the 
provisions can apply.  
                                                 
7
 For a discussion of the damages done to children due to the lack of recognition of 
‗psychological parents‘ see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered 
Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev.  1747, 1755 (1993). 
8
 See Chapter 3, pp 9-33. 
9
 James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a Family Context – A Cautionary Note, 
Santa Clara Law Review, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1053 at pp 1054-1055. 
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Evidently, the cases of Baby Ann
10
 and North Western Health Board v HW and 
CW
11
 presented very different considerations. Yet Article 42.5 was invoked and 
held to be relevant in both cases. From a simple reading of the Article, it appears 
to be specifically drafted to deal with permanent state intervention to replace 
unfit parents. In this respect, it is not designed to deal with conflicts between 
adoptive and natural parents nor to mandate short-term interventions such as the 
one sought in HW and CW
12
. The specific applications and extent of Article 42.5 
have been matters of judicial debate and disagreement throughout the 
development of the jurisprudence in the area. These issues still remains unclear 
to a certain extent.  
 
Therefore, it should be remembered that any new model will have to apply 
effectively to a number of different and diverse situations. Firstly, the state may 
have to make a temporary intervention, involving a short lived removal of the 
child from its parents‘ custody while not affecting the long term guardianship 
rights of the parent. Typically, this will be where a court orders something to be 
performed in the child‘s interests despite parental objections. This is what 
occurred in the recent case of Baby Janice
13
. Secondly, the state may have to 
make a temporary intervention to remove the child from parental custody and 
guardianship, potentially for an extended period of time. This will be the case 
where a child is put into medium or long term foster care.  
 
                                                 
10
 Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374. 
11
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Baby Janice, Unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004. 
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Thirdly, the state may have to make a permanent intervention, terminating the 
parents‘ guardianship and custody rights. An example of this under the current 
order is where a legitimate adoption has occurred or where a parent loses custody 
of their child under the grounds set down in Article 42.5. A further situation 
would be in the case of divorce or separation where the state has to choose which 
parent should have custody of the child
14
. While these applications will be dealt 
with in some detail as regards a proposed model, it should be remembered that 
the aim of this paper is to propose a general model. A detailed analysis of the 
application of the model to specific areas of family law would be beyond the 
remit of the thesis.  
 
Section C – Supporting the Family 
 
Introduction 
 
A necessary pre-cursor to proposing a new constitutional model for child 
protection is the task of establishing what role and what status parents and 
families are to be afforded. This section will analyse the extent and limits to the 
rights, duties and obligations of these important actors. The presented argument 
will be that while parents should be afforded some prima facie rights, the overall 
aim must be to support the family. Therefore, the state should not be limited by 
an over concentration on individual rights. 
 
Parents’ Right to Rights 
                                                 
14
 Where there is no parental agreement. 
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It is submitted that approaches such as those of Dwyer
15
 go too far. Without 
advocating parental hegemony, surely biological parents deserve some prima 
facie rights to custody and guardianship of their children. These rights are not as 
anomalous and unjustifiable as Dwyer suggests
16
. Firstly, parents have had a 
uniquely influential role in the creation and formation of the child. They will 
almost certainly have gone to great effort to raise the child, even if it is very 
young. Parents have an intimate biological and social relationship with the child, 
one that the state can hardly hope to replicate. Also, as Wardle has pointed out, 
despite the unrepresentative and misleading media coverage, the vast majority of 
families are caring, effective and indeed ideal units for children to be brought up 
in
17
. The state should recognise these facts in the form of legal protections. 
 
Dwyer contends that the intensity of the parental relationship is not itself a 
justification for parental rights
18
 and that, in any event, privileges would be more 
appropriate than rights
19
. He compares the parent attempting to assert legal rights 
over their child with other legal situations and concludes that there is something 
conceptually flawed about the idea of holding rights over another individual
20
.  
 
                                                 
15
 James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994). A similar model is proposed by Elizabeth 
Bartholet in Nobody’s Children: Abuse, Neglect, Foster Drift and the Adoption Alternative 
(1999). 
16
 For example, James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the 
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994) at p 1435.  
17
 Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children, 
27 Loy U. Chi. L.J. 321, Winter 1996 at p 327. 
18
 James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994) at p 1349. 
19
 Ibid at p 1440. 
20
 Ibid at p 1407. 
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However, this fails to appreciate the degree of effort that parents have put into 
the relationship and the unique and irreplaceable role they have played. The 
relationship of the biological parent to its child cannot be made analogous to any 
other legal position. It is, quite simply, unique. When this is appreciated, it can 
be understood why parents‘ rights seem ―…inconsistent with certain principles 
underlying all other individual rights recognized in our society.‖21 Attempts to 
atomize or control the relationship in any serious way will inevitably face 
problems.  
 
Advantages of Granting Parents Rights 
 
However, beyond parental entitlements, there are other justifications and 
advantages to guaranteeing parental rights in a Constitution. In the first place, on 
a symbolic level, it is important that the family is recognised as the primary unit 
in society. The state should enunciate its support of the family to illustrate value 
of the institution. It is also important to prevent parents believing that the state 
can easily intervene and remove their children. Parents must be able to form a 
bond with their children on some presumption of permanence, within reason. The 
law must provide a context in which parents are not apprehensive about 
procreating and in which they can assess their future with their child with a 
degree of certainty.  
 
Dwyer rejects the argument that limiting parental rights would weaken the bond 
between parents and children. He argues that such a claim is questionable and 
                                                 
21
 James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents' Rights, 82 California L. Rev. 1371 (1994) at p 1371. 
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lacking in supporting evidence
22
. However, Dwyer himself recognised the effect 
that rhetoric can have in the context of rights when he warned of the general 
effect that over-emphasising parental rights can have
23
. Equally, one can presume 
that failing to provide adequate protections for the family could undermine 
society‘s impressions of families and parent-child relationships in some way. It 
would send a message that the state does not hold the family or family 
relationships in any great esteem and it would undermine the perceived 
respectability of families.  
 
Huntington – despite arguing that an over-emphasis on rights can be damaging 
and counter productive – maintained that rights, including parental rights, would 
remain an essential part of any model: ―The basic interests underlying rights – 
that the state should not intervene in a family absent a showing of parental 
unfitness, and that children should be safe in their homes – should be retained in 
any legal model.‖24 This point notwithstanding, while parental rights can be 
accepted as being important, they should not be considered limitless or even 
worthy of special protection when children are at risk. 
 
Limiting Parental Rights 
 
A constitutional guarantee that the family represents the primary unit group of 
society, deserving of respect, does not necessarily require the wide ranging 
protections the family currently gets in Ireland. The constitution can promote and 
                                                 
22
 Ibid at p 1347. 
23
 At 1435 where he felt that this limited and isolated the interests of children 
24
 Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Children’s Welfare, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper Number 06-08, 55 UCLA Law Review 637 (2006) at p 687. 
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respect the family while at the same time providing for state intervention when 
families fail to live up to minimum societal standards of parenting. However 
many would assert that the family is entitled to some primordial right to freedom 
from intervention and that the state should be restrained from intervening in all 
but the most exceptional cases
25
. These arguments will now be assessed. 
 
Preserving the Traditional Family 
 
Francis Beytagh has argued that Article 41 is ―uniquely appropriate‖ in the 
modern world. He justified this position in the following way: ―Concern about 
the deterioration of the family as an essential unit in a society‘s structure has 
never been greater, and yet it remains more unusual than commonplace for the 
topic to be addressed in a nation‘s fundamental legal instrument. Ireland is thus 
to be commended.‖26 This argument is regularly invoked by conservatives and 
pro-family groups
27
. The argument is, essentially, that the current constitutional 
protections afforded to the family can act as a means of preserving the family, an 
institution that is widely accepted as being vital to society. 
 
However, one must question exactly what sort of effect such constitutional 
protections, and their legislative and judicial manifestations, actually have. As 
already mentioned, the rhetoric and aspirations provided in a constitution can be 
important. One could not deny that such provisions permit and in some cases 
                                                 
25
 Given the wording of Article 41 and the multiple natural law references therein, this is surely 
the position that the current constitutional order seeks to maintain.  
26
 Francis X. Beytagh, Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ireland: An American Perspective, 
RoundHall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 1997 at p. 118. 
27
 See, for example, the submission of Comhar Chriosti (at A50) to All Party Oireachtas 
Committee on the Constitution, Tenth Report – The Family, Stationary Office, Dublin, 2006. 
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oblige the law to comply with the constitutional norm. The now nonextant 
divorce prohibition was a stark example of this. However, in this respect all they 
do is frustrate individual citizens, preventing them from attaining legal 
acceptance of what will in any case be a practical reality. This may diminish the 
perceived legitimacy of the Constitution. Furthermore, a constitutional provision 
has only a limited ability to frame societal consciousness, even more so if it is 
out of touch with societal norms. As Ryan has illustrated, the constitutional 
support of the family in this jurisdiction has not to dissuade people from forming 
alternative family types
28
. 
 
In the context of the family, over-emphasising family autonomy and parental 
rights potentially leaves children vulnerable to abuse and harm. Wardle 
summarised the limits of this argument: ―Nostalgia (usually fostered by highly 
selective memories) does not qualify as a legal theory of merit. Society needs to 
meet the challenges of the modern era, which is the greatest, most exhilarating, 
fulfilling, and wonderful time for families, as well as the most challenging, 
dangerous, and potentially disastrous time for families.‖29 Undoubtedly, a 
constitution should contain some societal aspirations. However, it should not 
attempt to reflect a society that does not exist nor to establish one that is not 
possible. 
 
Preserving Diversity 
 
                                                 
28
 Fergus W. Ryan, Recognising Family Diversity: Children, One-Parent Families and the Law, 
(2006) 9(1) IJFL 3. 
29
 Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children, 
27 Loy U. Chi. L.J. 321, Winter 1996 at pp 323-324. 
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An argument often posed is that protecting parental autonomy and parental rights 
promotes diversity in a pluralist society
30
. Undoubtedly, the state does not want 
to extend its reach so as to ignore the existence of cultures within it. However, 
the law must always set limits. The law must insist on protection of certain 
standards regardless of cultural norms that may contradict the standards. Liberal 
democracies accept that their societies will not be entirely uniform, but they do 
not grant a carte blanche. Essentially, societal diversity and child protection are 
not mutually exclusive and surely the latter is a more pressing concern than the 
former. 
 
Fearing the State 
 
Parental rights proponents often evoke fears of an over-active Platonic state, 
taking the place of parents and attempting to impose itself as a parent on a 
national scale. Indeed, it is consistently claimed that the constitutional 
protections of the family have prevented many abuses of state power in this 
jurisdiction
31
. Evidence is rarely raised to substantiate these claims. One must 
ask why the modern, neo-liberal State would be so eager to take the place of 
parents? The neo-liberal state values the role played by the family in removing a 
complex and costly area from the State‘s remit and only seeks to intervene when 
                                                 
30
 Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic 
Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1975 at p 992. 
31
 See, for example, Duncan, The Constitutional Protection of Parental Rights, in The Report of 
the Constitutional Review Group, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1996, Appendix 22, at p 625. 
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it feels the family has failed. To a substantial extent, the Orwellian fears of the 
twentieth century have receded in the twenty first
32
.  
 
Goldstein argues that family autonomy and parental rights prevent judges or 
doctors from imposing their preferences on parents. He says that ―… a prime 
function of law is to prevent one person's truth… from becoming another 
person's tyranny.‖33 However, laws regularly act in this way. The majority of 
citizens often set standards that minorities, sometimes very large minorities
34
, 
may disagree with. Surely, in the same way, minimum standards can be 
democratically set for parenting.  
 
This is not to say, however, that the State will completely govern parenting but, 
rather, it will step in when parenting is falling below acceptable standards. In this 
respect, it is worth remembering that intervention will only occur in a small 
minority of families. Almost by definition, democratically set minimum 
standards will be inferior to the standards most parents set. Moreover, 
intervention does not have to be in the form of removing children. The state can 
act
35
 to protect the child without removing the child from the long or medium 
term custody of the parent. The idea is not that the state should take over; it is 
that it should force parents to do their job according to democratically set 
minimum standards, either by actual intervention or threat thereof.  
                                                 
32
 ‗See for example, the recent efforts at a government level to limit the amount of elderly people 
seeking state residential care: ‗Old-age pension likely to increase to €208‘, Miriam Donohoe, The 
Irish Times, Thursday, November 30, 2006. 
33
 Joseph Goldstein, Medical care for the Child at risk: on State Supervention of Parental 
Autonomy , The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 86, No. 4, Mar, 1977, pp 645-670 at p 664.  
34
 The 1995 divorce referendum in Ireland represents a good example where the margin of 
victory in a national referendum was just 9,098 votes. 
35
 For example, by ordering that certain medical procedures be carried out or not.  
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The state and its laws have been consistently described as ‗too crude an 
instrument‘36 to deal with family life. Goldstein believes this is because the legal 
system ―does not have the capacity to deal on an individual basis with the 
consequences of its decisions or to act with the deliberate speed required by a 
child‘s sense of time and essential to his well being.‖37 This would appear to be a 
fair criticism. The state will surely never be as flexible or adaptable as the family 
as regards parenting on a regular basis. However this criticism does not extend to 
impugning the state‘s ability to make one-off short term interferences such as 
ordering beneficial medical treatment. Here, the law can be quite refined and 
effective. At the end of the interference, the child is returned to its parents.  
 
In his judgment in North Western Health Board v HW and CW
38
, Hardiman J 
referred to the United States case of Buck v Bell
39
 to highlight the dangers of the 
state assuming that it is scientifically and morally right and imposing these 
assumed norms on others. While he accepted that there was no real comparison 
to the case at issue, he concluded: ―The lesson of it [Buck v Bell] to my mind is 
that it is better to hesitate at the threshold of compulsion, even in its most 
benevolent form, than to adopt an easy but reductionist utilitarianism whose 
consequences may be unpredictable.‖40  
 
                                                 
36
 For example in Joseph Goldstein, Medical care for the Child at risk: on State Supervention of 
Parental Autonomy , The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 86, No. 4, Mar, 1977, pp 645-670. 
37
 Ibid at p 650. 
38
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. 
39
 Buck v Bell 274 US 200. This was the attempt of Carrie Buck, an inmate of a State institution 
for the ―feeble minded‖ to avoid compulsory sterilisation on the basis, inter alia, of the equal 
protection clause and the due process clause of the 14th amendment to the United States 
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This would be a powerful argument but for his admitted existence of a crucial 
distinction between cases such as Buck v Bell
41
 and HW and CW
42
. The 
distinction is that in Buck v Bell
43
 the state was attempting compel a party to the 
proceedings to do something. In HW and CW
44
, the subject, a child, was not a 
party to the proceedings nor was it capable of making its own decision as to the 
legal decision pertaining. In Buck v Bell, the decision was whether to compel or 
not to compel the individual involved. In HW and CW
45
, the decision was 
whether parents would compel the child not to take the PKU test, or whether the 
state would compel it to take it. Essentially, it was impossible for the state to 
‗hesitate at the threshold of compulsion‘ in HW and CW46. Again we are faced 
with the reality that the child presents a unique dilemma for the law.  
 
Abandoning the Family 
 
These examples illustrate a crucial point. Often, in the context of child 
protection, the state cannot be neutral, it cannot abstain. In many cases the state 
will have to choose between parental autonomy and child protection, implicitly 
or explicitly. From a philosophical perspective, the state acts whether it 
intervenes or does not intervene. As Judith G. McMulle put it, state inaction is a 
misnomer. When the state chooses not to intervene it implicitly chooses to 
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preserve the status quo and parental rights
47
. Non-intervention is a policy choice 
in exactly the same way that the decision to adopt an interventionist policy is.  
 
It could also be argued that this choice – to leave parenting to parents in all but 
the most extreme cases – represents an abandonment by the state of its duties to 
support the family. In effect, this decision absolves the state of any duty to 
support families by making sure that families are operating within social norms. 
It might also be argued that, by leaving the family to its own devices, the state 
abandons the family and inhibits its ability to function properly by not effectively 
protecting it from poverty. McMulle highlights this problem: ―There is a fine line 
between autonomy, which implies independence from outside meddling and 
destructive interference, and isolation, which implies a lack of social supports 
and a lack of accountability to community norms for behaviour. Isolation from 
the community has been shown to have a negative impact on families.‖48 
 
This concept is crucial. One cannot afford to restrict the state to the degree that it 
cannot help families. Disadvantaged families will often need state support to 
survive. The state should not be afraid to give it. Independence should not be 
equated with capacity. James G. Dwyer makes a valuable addition to this 
argument. He points out that it is still common for judges and commentators to 
presume that non-intervention is always in the parent‘s interests and concludes: 
―I am going to go out on a limb and suggest that parents do not benefit from 
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being able to abuse their children.‖49 He points out that state intervention, even 
permanent intervention, can be beneficial for the child, the family and for the 
parent, in the long term in that it prevents the family from destroying itself and 
preserves the potential for reconciliation in the future. This point does not have to 
be limited to child abuse. Familial relationships will surely suffer when a family 
is forced to live in disadvantaged circumstances due to a lack of state support. 
 
As Dwyer points out, we should refrain from seeing intervention as being ‗for‘ a 
child or ‗against‘ a parent and start framing it in what is best for the family50. 
Furthermore, it must be recognised that the state has an interest in children being 
raised properly and the family is widely accepted as the best model. Therefore, 
the most effective model should not be concerned with vindicating or limiting the 
rights of states, families, parents or children. It must be concerned with 
supporting families and allowing them to do their job properly. Ultimately 
though, the fact parents will err must be accepted and the law must be capable of 
rectifying those mistakes.  
 
Section D – Protecting the Rights of the Child 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been accepted that parents should be afforded rights and that the family 
should be legally protected. However, these considerations cannot justify the 
                                                 
49
 James, G Dwyer, Symposium, Children’s Interests in a Family Context – A Cautionary Note, 
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surrendering of the aim of child protection. It is submitted that certain basic 
children‘s rights should be explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. These rights 
are included to guarantee children that parents, or anybody, must treat children 
according to certain minimum standards established by society. It is further 
submitted that this guarantee should be less qualified than the Article 40.3 
provision
51
; indeed, it should involve a positive constitutional obligation on the 
state to make sure that children‘s rights are being vindicated.  
 
These rights exist not to allow the state to take the place of the parent – although 
in practice this may be necessary in some situations – but to allow the state to 
impose its minimum standards on parents in certain situations when essentially 
children‘s rights are being impaired. The elements of this proposal will now be 
assessed and the specific rights that might be included will be briefly examined. 
It should be remembered however that the goal of this paper is to promote a 
general model and not to explore the extensive task of exhaustively enumerating 
the rights needed in new model. Insofar as an examination of specific rights goes 
beyond the aforementioned delimits, this is a necessary tangent as the decisions 
as to which rights are chosen might be as significant as deciding whether or not 
to afford children specific rights at all. 
 
A Rights Approach 
 
As was discussed in chapter three, rights based approaches have been widely 
criticised for having a variety of inherent flaws. Nevertheless, the rights based 
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model is appropriate here for several reasons. Firstly, it is accepted that 
children‘s rights will only form a part of the solution. Other mechanisms will be 
needed to endow a constitution with the capability of adequately governing law 
in a range of family situations. Even the harshest critics of rights approaches 
recognise the importance of rights as long as they are not held out as the ultimate 
answer
52
. 
 
Secondly, as Lynn Wardle has argued
53
, rights can be especially important in the 
context of modern society. In a period when states are potentially more powerful 
than they have ever been, it is recognised that certain rights should be extended 
to all humans. In a more complex world, people require more to be self-
supporting. Perhaps most importantly of all in this context, Wardle points out 
that many of the mediating structures in society – such as large nuclear families, 
churches etc. – have disappeared or are in the process of disappearing54. 
Consequently – in the absence of the protections of such institutions – positive 
legal rights assume a greater importance.   
 
Burdening the State 
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As already mentioned, any children‘s rights guarantee should oblige the state to 
actively endeavour to vindicate the rights guaranteed. This is necessary because 
children, unlike most rights holders, may not have the mental capacity or 
physical ability to vindicate their rights. Huntington summarised this difficulty: 
―This [the common conception55] conception of rights does not advance the 
interests of children in the child welfare system because children simply do not 
benefit from this sort of autonomy… They are not autonomous legally or 
practically.‖56 It appears that the Constitutional Review Group appreciated this 
problem when they advocated a ―…re-wording of the State‘s duty to the child‖.57  
 
While the case of Baby Janice
58
 shows that the courts will step in when it is 
absolutely necessary, surely the limits of, and justifications for, such actions 
should be clearly laid out. This is further warranted by the fact that the courts are 
likely to be faced with more complex and problematic cases in the future
59
. It is 
submitted that these rights should be exhaustively and explicitly set out because 
of the extra obligation imposed on the state in regard to them. Rights not 
protected under this schedule would be protected by Article 40.3 where relevant. 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
                                                 
55
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The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has been consistently 
mooted as a valuable basis for children‘s rights and protections60. Additionally, 
Ireland is a signatory to the convention and therefore morally, if not legally, 
bound to comply with its aspirations. The state has been criticised for failing to 
do so
61
. Consequently, the Convention is posited as an ideal basis for children‘s 
rights. The Convention is an extensive schedule aimed at addressing a wide 
variety of child related issues and applying to 195 United Nations member states. 
Additionally, many of the rights proposed are already protected by Irish 
constitutional law and otherwise. Therefore, much of the rights in the convention 
are superfluous or irrelevant in this context. However if these surplus provisions 
are stripped away, a number of valuable provisions can be identified. 
 
Article 2 portends to extend the Convention rights to the children of all signatory 
states without discrimination on any arbitrary grounds
62
. It would appear that 
Ireland is not respecting this Article at least in that it affords ostensibly
63
 greater 
protections to marital children than to non-marital ones. This should be remedied 
in any new order of rights and it appears that this has been appreciated. The 
Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2007 seemed to endeavour 
to provide for more equal treatment between marital and non-marital children. 
However, it is important that other protections are properly afforded and that the 
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exercise represents a levelling up rather than the levelling down that Carolan 
accused the 2007 Bill of proposing
64
.  
 
As regards substantive rights beyond the superfluous, Article 7.1 provided that 
the child has ―a right to be registered immediately after birth, acquire a 
nationality, a name and as far as possible to know and be cared for by his or her 
parents.‖ Other rights provided in the Convention include a general right to 
health
65
 and to an adequate standard of living
66
. 
 
The Convention also affords some procedural rights. Most noticeably, Article 3 
provides that the best interests of the child should be ―a paramount 
consideration‖ in any legal action concerning children. The fact that it will be a 
paramount consideration rather than the paramount consideration illustrates that 
this is a watering down of what, as previously discussed, is already a somewhat 
flawed standard.  
 
The convention also provides that in ―matters‖ concerning the child, the child‘s 
opinions should be heard and given due weight
67
. Article 12.2 provides that the 
child should be ―heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting 
the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body‖. 
These articles are representative of a general tone in the Convention that suggests 
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that children should have a greater role in judicial and administrative decisions 
concerning them. This is consistent with many calls from academics and 
specialists
68
 for children to be given a greater say in the decision-making process. 
 
Procedural Rights 
 
In their 1973 work Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
69
, Goldstein Freud and 
Solnit made a somewhat novel suggestion in calling for children to be given a 
right to a speedy hearing in court in cases regarding their placement or removal 
from family. This is due to their core principle that the law should respect the 
child‘s sense of time70. They note how delay in such proceedings can be very 
damaging to children in such cases as children demand security and can find 
parental absence overwhelming
71
. This problem is well illustrated by the damage 
done by administrative and legal delay in Baby Ann
72
 and Re JH, an infant
73
. 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit recommend that proceedings as to placements of 
children should be completed ―with all deliberate speed‖74. This right would 
seem to provide several crucial advantages to child protection while only mildly 
inconveniencing the justice system generally.  
 
Child Representation 
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As regards children appearing in court, the prevailing wisdom in Ireland is that 
the benefit of the child‘s participation is outweighed by the disadvantage of the 
child being traumatised by the adversarial and uncompassionate nature of the 
adversarial system
75
. As Geoffrey Shannon has observed, this has left the child 
unrepresented or unheard in many cases
76
. Shannon argues that the best means of 
obviating this shortcoming is the provision of separate legal representation of 
children, a facility now provided for in this state in the form of a guardian ad 
litem
77
.  
 
While the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the installation of the child as a 
party to the proceedings are provided for in the Children Act 2001, there are 
some deficiencies. Most notably, when the child is made a party to proceedings, 
a guardian ad litem cannot be appointed. Shannon calls this a ―key lacuna‖ since 
―a lawyer, while talented in the advocacy of law, may not necessarily be the best 
equipped to identify and advocate the social and emotional needs of a child.‖78 
Many commentators
79
 have realised that the right to representation is a crucial 
one and this position is visible in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. A constitutional right guaranteeing children representation in legal 
proceedings concerning them might well be justified. 
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Section E – State Intervention 
 
Introduction 
 
The point has been consistently made in this paper that no amount of parental or 
children‘s rights can effectively protect and provide for children. As was 
discussed, the state must take an active role, within reason, in supporting families 
to allow them to function properly. Nevertheless, regardless of the rights 
afforded or the welfare support provided, the state will inevitably be called on to 
take the place of some unworthy parents. Even the 1937 Constitution recognised 
this fact
80
. Consequently, the boundaries of this action should be set.  
 
It seems especially appropriate that the justifications for such intervention and 
the limitations of it should be constitutionally provided. In part, this is because 
such limits are currently provided for by Article 42.5. Moreover, it is surely 
desirable that the highest legal authority should have something to say on such a 
serious issue, namely: the situations in which children can be removed from 
families. Again, a full examination of these bounds is beyond the scope of this 
thesis as it strays into the realms of specific legislating. Nevertheless, a brief 
examination might prove useful by illustrating how a more equitable balance 
could be adopted.  
 
Voluntary Intervention 
                                                 
80
 Most noticeably in Article 42.5. 
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Marsha Garrison argues that it is important to distinguish between occasions 
when the state intervenes coercively and when it intervenes on the voluntary 
invitation of the parents
81
. She proposes that more parents actually seek welfare 
than are coerced into the system. In this context, she criticises some limited 
intervention models
82
 for failing to take voluntary care into account when 
limiting intervention to cases of serious harm
83
. The argument is that, firstly, the 
state should not be limited by standards largely set to apply to the unfortunate 
context of coercive intervention. Secondly, and more importantly, different 
standards should apply since the law cannot allow parents to use the state as a 
substitute parent when it suits them and regain the custody of their children at 
their pleasure. This may be possible because under limited intervention models 
there may be a requirement that parents have abused or hurt their children for the 
state to deny them custody.  
 
This situation would be clearly unfair on children and on the state. Garrison 
proposes that the concepts of child protection and public assistance should be 
distinguished
84
. In the case of the latter, a delicate balance will have to be struck 
and standards ―must be sensitive to both the minimum intervention philosophy in 
regard to child protection and the state's interests in regard to cost control and 
administrative efficiency.‖85 Consequently she advocates biological parents 
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retaining a substantial say in the upbringing of the child although not having 
custody and guardianship rights
86
.  
 
Permanent Coercive Intervention 
 
Article 42.5 of the Constitution authorizes, and arguably obliges, the state to take 
the place of parents in exceptional cases where ―the parents for physical or moral 
reasons fail in their duty to their children‖. This provision is obviously focused 
on parental failure. In that respect it is not focused on child protection nor is it 
focused on supporting or helping families. In effect, it espouses a doctrine of 
parental rights. These rights will be paramount under the Article 42.5 order 
unless parents fail in an exceptional way. Michael Wald has observed that this 
focus on parental fault is common
87
. He argues that this focus is undesirable.  
 
Firstly, he points out that such a focus limits judicial consideration of the child‘s 
concerns
88
. The knock-on effect is that statutes that adopt a parental focus are 
unsophisticated and unable to deal with the complex subject that is family law. 
Wald illustrates why this is: ―…all available evidence indicates that it is 
extremely difficult to correlate parental behaviour or home conditions with 
specific harms to a child, especially if the predicted harm involves long-term, 
rather than immediate, effects of the environment. Even in very ―bad‖ homes, the 
impact of the home environment will vary depending upon the age of a child, the 
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nature of family interactions, developmental differences among children, and 
many other factors.‖89 
 
Consequently, courts may make interventions on the basis of parental fault where 
the child‘s needs may not warrant it. Equally, and as Wald points out, a lack of 
parental fault may render courts unwilling to intervene in a situation in which it 
is necessary for child protection
90
. However Wald proceeds to prescribe a very 
restrictive model limiting intervention to cases where the harm to the child is 
―serious‖91. He accepts that this standard will leave children unprotected in 
certain exceptional cases.
92
 Surely, such a surrender is not acceptable. 
 
Garrison provides a less compromising approach
93
. However, Garrison concedes 
that ultimately, ―courts will thus be forced to confront the question of when 
parental rights to obtain the child's return should be terminated.‖94 She argues 
that custody rights should not be permanently terminated until three years of care 
but that an application should then be lodged automatically. This time period is 
due to ―the low risk of instability during the early years of placement and the fact 
that many parents regain their children during this time‖95.  
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It should be noted that termination will not be automatic and the application‘s 
success will be subject to certain conditions. Firstly, there must be conditions that 
require continued foster care
96
. Secondly, Garrison argues that there must be 
evidence that the parent has failed to make substantial progress toward achieving 
reunification, despite meaningful assistance from the foster care agency
97
. This 
achieves Garrison‘s stated aims of protecting children, giving parents adequate 
time to resolve issues and affording child welfare agencies adequate incentives to 
ensure that parents receive services needed to achieve reunification. 
 
Such an approach would appear to be more satisfactory. Many commentators 
have lamented the many years children have to spend in care because 
constitutional protections prevent them being adopted
98
. As Garrison points out, 
children become less and less likely to return to their parents the longer they 
spend in foster care
99
. Termination and adoption would provide the permanency 
and stability they need.  
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She further argues that termination should be available without 3 years 
placement in certain exceptional cases
100
. These largely correspond to the cases 
outlined in Article 42.5. in cases of ―abandonment or if, due to mental or 
physical illness, mental retardation, or long-term imprisonment, the parent is 
incapable of providing adequate child care in the foreseeable future.‖  
 
Conclusion 
 
This brief examination of the bounds of intervention illustrates one crucial 
conclusion. It is essential that intervention standards are set according to the 
requirements of child protection and not according to parental fault and the result 
of rights balancing. While much of the specifics will have to be dealt with in 
legislation, this principle can be applied to a general constitutional model. 
 
Section F – A New Model 
Introduction 
 
The primary assertion of this thesis is that no one constitutional model will be 
able to achieve the goal of child protection on its own. This is because of the 
varying weaknesses and strengths of the various models and the range of legal 
situations to which a constitutional norm will have to apply. Rather, any new 
model must represent a compromise, a conglomeration of the various models. 
This section will aim to draw together the advantages of various models into one 
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combined model. The guiding considerations will first be briefly recapped. 
Thereafter, the proposed combined model will be summarised. 
 
Supporting the Family 
 
It has been observed that the best way to protect children is to support their 
families and give them the opportunities to thrive. Any constitutional order 
should respect the family as the primary unit group in society. The social policy 
advantages of this emphasis are obvious and have been dealt with above. The 
Constitution should pledge the state to support the family and protect it from 
attack. Likewise, in individual cases, courts should be compelled to consider the 
welfare and survival of the family as a primary consideration, subject only to the 
interests of its individual members. Parents too must be afforded rights.  
 
However these guarantees and rights should not extend to guaranteeing parents 
or the family natural and imprescriptible rights superior and anterior to positive 
law. Such guarantees afford parents and families a level of legal protection that is 
unhelpfully difficult to mitigate. As has been illustrated, this level of protection 
has absolutely no reasonable justification. It does however cause many serious 
problems.  
 
The Rights of the Child 
 
In the first place, parental and family protections should be subordinated when 
certain fundamental children‘s rights have been infringed or are likely to be 
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infringed. An exhaustive discussion of the rights that should be afforded would 
be beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain fundamental rights can be 
proposed. These rights would fall under two primary categories, namely 
substantive and procedural rights. 
 
Obviously, the choice of rights and the wording of their provision will be crucial. 
However much of this legislating would be pointless unless the state‘s obligation 
towards the vindication of these rights is altered. It must be remembered that a 
significant body of unenumerated rights were afforded to children under the 1937 
Constitution. Therefore, the state must be given a positive obligation and an 
active jurisdiction to enforce these rights. The vindication of these rights may 
require short term action such as a court order to enforce a necessary operation. 
However, they may also require permanent action such as where a child‘s right to 
life or health is under threat. As already discussed, because of the unusual power 
of enforcement imposed on the state in respect of these rights, they should 
probably be provided for by way of an explicit and exhaustive schedule.  
 
Protecting the Interests of the Child 
 
However, regardless of attempts to make the law more concerned with problem 
solving and supporting families, it must be accepted that the courts will, in some 
cases, be called on to make a definitive ruling in matters concerning the child. 
Consequently, a standard should be set to protect children in legal proceedings. It 
is proposed that the most effective standard is that proposed by Goldstein, Freud 
and Solnit. Namely, in any legal proceedings regarding the placement of the 
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child the court should attempt to implement ―the least detrimental available 
alternative for safeguarding the child‘s growth and development‖101. The 
advantages of the standard were discussed in detail in chapter three
102
. This 
standard most effectively reconciles the potentially conflicting policies of 
protecting children from harm and preventing unnecessary removals from 
families. It is also appropriate for dealing with situations such as custody 
proceedings involving both parents.  
 
Summary 
 
As a starting point, the Constitution should stress the importance of the family 
and its role as the primary unit group in society, deserving of protection. This 
must be ameliorated by a promise on the part of the state to support families. 
This represents an attempt to produce a model more concerned with problem 
solving. The state should also recognise certain conditional parental rights to the 
custody of their children. However, these rights should be without prejudice to 
certain indefeasible minimum standards of parenting, protected by children‘s 
rights. These children‘s rights should be coupled with a burden on the state to 
ensure their enforcement. In this way, a shift in concentration on the protection 
of children instead of on parental fault is achieved. Finally, the Constitution 
should guarantee that in any placement decisions regarding children, the court 
will attempt to secure the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding 
the child‘s growth and development. 
 
                                                 
101
 Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, The Free Press, New York, 
1973 at p 53. 
102
 See pages 23-28. 
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The aims of this model are, broadly, four fold. Firstly, the model enunciates the 
state‘s respect of the family and of parents. Secondly, the model aims to make 
the state more active in its support of the family and to be more holistic and less 
adversarial in its organisation of legal proceedings relating to the family. Thirdly, 
the state guarantees its protection of certain indefeasible children‘s rights and its 
obligation to defend them. Finally, the model aims to set a broad standard to 
govern legal proceedings relating to children, namely the ‗least detrimental 
alternative‘ standard.  
 
Section G – Applications of a New Model 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis began in chapter one by outlining the current state of the 
constitutional law and by highlighting some of the weaknesses of the current 
order. Consequently, having proposed an alternative model, the applications of 
that model of this new model should be assessed. Two distinct applications will 
be assessed in turn. 
 
The North Western Health Board v HW and CW/Baby Janice Situation 
 
The judgment of North Western Health Board v HW and CW
103
 provoked 
considerable disquiet in the legal academic community in Ireland
104. The court‘s 
                                                 
103
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. 
104
 See, for example, Raymond Arthur, North Western Health Board v HW and CW – 
Reformulating Irish Family Law, Irish Law Times, (2002) 20 ILT 39; Dr Ursula Kilkelly and Dr 
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decision was seen as unreasonably subjugating the rights of the child. However it 
is submitted that concerns over the factual result were somewhat misplaced. In a 
sense, the result of the case is not as galling as it is often described. Denham J 
highlighted the weaknesses of the state‘s position: ―There was no particular 
reason why this child should be tested for PKU. There was no relevant family 
history. There were no circumstances which made it particularly apt for the child 
to have the test.‖105 Furthermore, only one form of testing was made available 
and the test was not made compulsory by the legislature, in this country or in any 
country
106
.  
 
It could be argued that even if the Supreme Court considered itself capable of 
considering the rights of the child – as it surely would under the proposed model 
– they would still have found in favour of the parents. This is because it is not 
obvious that any serious right of the child is being substantially infringed.  
 
Ultimately however, reform of the procedure would be welcome and for many 
reasons. Firstly, it would make cases like HW and CW
107
 less objectionable and 
ostensibly more equitable by properly taking account of the rights and interests 
of children. Secondly, it would expressly provide for situations such as the one in 
Baby Janice
108
 where the courts feel obliged to take action. This form of 
extraordinary court enforcement on the basis of constitutional protections should 
surely be laid out in as explicit a fashion as is possible. 
                                                                                                                                    
Conor O'Mahony, The Proposed Children's Rights Amendment: Running to Stand Still?, (2007) 
10(2) IJFL 19; Geoffrey Shannon, Child Law, Thompson Round Hall, Dublin, 2005. 
105
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622 at 717. 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622. 
108
 Baby Janice, Unreported, High Court, August 5, 2004. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new order would allow the courts to 
deal effectively with more complex, unforeseen cases due to the fact that it 
would deal more specifically and explicitly with rights. We might expect to see 
more complicated cases involving children‘s rights because Ireland‘s recent 
immigration experience is likely to produce a far more culturally diverse society. 
Within such a society, minority ethnic and religious groups may enforce 
practices on children that might be considered harmful and contrary to societal 
norms. This phenomenon in the United Kingdom – a country with a longer and 
more extensive experience of immigration -  is well described by Caroline 
Bridge
109
.  
 
However a more subtle application of the model might be the use of the problem-
solving model and case conferencing. A conference could be convened including 
the parents, healthcare professionals and social workers. This conference could 
then propose a plan of action to deal with the issue at hand. A potential result in 
the HW and CW case is that another form of testing could have been proposed. In 
any event, the procedure seems far more suited to the process of complex 
medical decision-making than the zero-sum nature of court proceedings.  
                                                 
109
 See Bridge Religion, Culture and Conviction - the Medical Treatment of Young Children, 
Child and Family Law Quarterly, CFam 11.1(1), March 1999. Several examples of complex legal 
dilemmas are cited. In Re S (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376, doctors tried 
several procedures which increased the child‘s suffering – due to parental objection to a blood 
transfusion – before resorting to getting a High Court order to force the transfusion. In Re C 
(Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384 Jewish parents sought to direct doctors to resuscitate 
their dying infant despite the futility of doing so and the highly distressing nature of the 
procedure. In the case of T (Wardship: Medical Treatment)  [1997] 1 FLR 502 a mother refused a 
liver transplant for her infant cause it would cause undue suffering even though medical opinion 
was unanimous that this was in the child‘s best interests. In Re B [1981] 1 WLR 1421 the parents 
of a baby born with Down's syndrome and an intestinal obstruction refused consent to relatively 
straightforward surgery believing that it would be kinder to let their baby die. Bridge cites 
numerous other highly controversial and legally trying cases. 
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The Baby Ann Situation 
 
The deficiencies of the law as it stands relating to custody disputes in the Baby 
Ann
110
 mould
111
 have been assessed in chapter one. In a similar manner to the 
above situation, it is as much the judicial decision-making method as the actual 
result occasioned that was of concern. Considerations of the child‘s welfare were 
largely subjugated to the rights and privileges of the marital parent. Moreover, 
the process creates a zero-sum mentality and a winner-take-all result. This is a 
wholly inappropriate to deal with families and the upbringing of children. The 
new model would rectify these flaws.  
 
In the first place, the new constitutional model would mandate that the courts 
take a more holistic, problem-solving approach. The courts‘ sole role should not 
be solely to decide which party‘s rights are superior. Rather, the courts should 
attempt to implement a policy that most helps all parties and supports the 
families. This creates a problem, of course, in this type of case because the whole 
issue at hand in such cases is that the relevant family is not easily established
112
. 
However it is submitted that in such cases the courts can, by relaxing the 
importance of rights and attempting to promote the family structures in which the 
child has an interest, produce results that recognise the value and accord 
importance to all competing parties, even if the privileges afforded in the 
                                                 
110
 Baby Ann [2006] 4 IR 374. 
111
 Namely, a case where natural parents seek to regain custody from adoptive parents after the 
child has spent substantial time with the adoptive parents following a failed or incomplete 
adoption procedure. 
112
 The fact that this thesis will not address the definition of the family was addressed at page 3 of 
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judgment fall short of what certain parties had hoped for. This could be done by 
giving extensive visiting and participation rights to the parents who fail in the 
proceedings. The case conference could be especially useful in this respect.  
 
However, ultimately a decision will have to be made as to custody in such cases. 
One cannot precisely predict what the effect of any constitutional model might be 
on complicated custody cases such as the ones in question. These cases involve 
idiosyncratic factual issues and only a court can definitively produce a legal 
conclusion. One can, however, speculate as to the way in which a new 
constitutional order might frame the case.  
 
The first and most crucial difference is that the courts would not impose any 
presumption that the child‘s best interests are found in the marital family. The 
court would acknowledge the importance of the family and the conditional rights 
of the biological parent and retain them as factors for consideration. The courts 
should also consider the relevant rights of the child. 
 
However, the ultimate decision must be made according to some accepted 
standard. It is submitted that such a case should not be considered under the 
context of some state intervention standard. While the adoptive parents may have 
come into the child‘s custody through state aid, they are clearly separate actors to 
the state. As mentioned above, the proposed measure for dealing with any child 
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placement proceedings is the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit standard
113
. The 
flexibility of this standard is well illustrated in this context. 
 
In the final pages of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
114
, the authors 
considered the application of this standard to such disputes. They quote 
extensively from their fictitious ‗Judge Baltimore‘ espousing a dispassionate and 
laudable approach to such cases. The Judge begins by pointing out that whatever 
the judicial result, there will be hardship
115
. His approach is to try to limit that 
hardship as much as possible. He says that a judge should ignore his own 
emotions and experiences because, ―these feelings should compel me to place 
child with its biological parents, as compensation for their suffering‖.116 
Adopting a utilitarian approach, he concludes the lesser harm is done by 
awarding custody to the psychological parent as this harms only the biological 
parent while the alternative will often harm the child and the psychological 
parent. The judge espouses a social policy of increasing the number of adequate 
parents and concludes: ―Only in the implementation of this policy does there lie a 
real opportunity for beginning to break the cycle of sickness and hardship 
bequeathed from one generation to the next by adults who as children were 
denied the least detrimental alternative.‖117 
 
                                                 
113
 Namely, in any legal proceedings regarding the placement of the child the court should 
attempt to implement ―the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child‘s 
growth and development‖. 
114
 Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, The Free Press, New York, 
1973. 
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 Ibid at p 108. 
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 Ibid at p 109 
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However even after this seemingly decisive result, the holistic, pro-family focus 
could have an influence. This is because while custody has been granted, it has 
been granted in the child‘s interests and not because any set of rights have been 
deemed superior. A hypothetical application could be where a court orders a case 
conference to decide on the degree and organization of the unsuccessful parents‘ 
access to the child. This might result in increased access for the parents who are 
not granted custody. While one might argue that this would be unlikely to be 
successful, it should be remembered that failure to come to a consensus would 
result further legal proceedings as to the issue.  
 
Section H – Conclusion 
 
The central argument of this thesis should be briefly summarised at this point. 
Chapter one proposed that the Constitution is in need of amendment. This was 
due to the fact that it is incapable of adequately protecting children and unsuited 
to judicial reform. The current constitutional provisions on the child and the 
family have lead to controversial and somewhat perverse logical judgments in 
courts
118
.  Chapter two continued this argument by proposing that underlying 
constitutional philosophy should be re-assessed and replaced. The 1930s Roman 
Catholic philosophy that grounds the Constitution is anachronistic and is 
inappropriate in today‘s Ireland. Equally, if natural law was ever an appropriate 
basis of constitutional law in any state at any time, it is no longer so in this state.  
                                                 
118
 Even where the actual legal result was not necessarily perverse such as the conclusion in 
North Western Health Board v HW and CW [2001] IR 622 that the courts had no jurisdiction to 
enforce the child‘s right if it existed. Likewise, in Baby Ann[2006] 4 IR 374 – due to the legally 
advised marriage of the parents –  the court was forced to consider the welfare of the child of 
secondary importance despite the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 due to the constitutional 
protection of the marital family. 
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These changes would make it possible for a new constitutional schedule to be 
adopted and to be adopted democratically and on the basis of objective criteria. 
Chapter three set out a range of alternative models. The central argument of the 
chapter was that many of the models held up as potentially providing the answer 
in the area of constitutional child protection are flawed. They might, if adopted, 
make matters worse for some children in some cases. The obvious synthesis of 
this dialectic is that any new constitutional model should involve a combination 
of models, attempting to draw on the best aspects of each.  
 
Chapter four sought to illustrate how this could be achieved. It was emphasised 
that we must recognise the advantages and limitations of each model proposed. 
Specifically, it was proposed that the new constitutional order should retain its 
recognition and its guarantee to protect the family, at least to a certain extent. 
However it was argued that the state should place more of an emphasis on 
supporting and helping families and the judicial system should focus more on 
holistic approaches to family legal disputes than to zero-sum, winner-take-all 
proceedings. Nevertheless, the new constitutional order should recognise and 
guarantee certain parental and children‘s rights in the area. The latter should be 
accompanied by a special obligation on the state to guarantee their enforcement. 
Finally the ‗least detrimental alternative‘ standard was proposed as the guiding 
constitutional standard. While it is accepted that one might reasonably conclude 
that a different model would be more effective, it is surely incorrect to suggest 
that the central argument is not valid. Ultimately, the adoption of any model must 
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be based on objective criteria and not on any belief in the primordial supremacy 
of parents or the family.   
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